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ABSTRACT 
 
The Dynamics of Corporate Death 
 
 
An investigation into the use of mathematical models in 
the prediction of corporate failure, and their utility to 
corporate interest groups. 
 
 
The principle objective of this study was to investigate whether a model might exist with 
which interest groups could help determine the likely future state of a company. It was suggested 
that ratio analysis might provide the basis for one such class of models. 
A review of previous studies on the use of such models indicated the potential success of 
this approach, although three drawbacks were noted. Firstly, the data from which the most 
promising models were prepared (those due to E.I. Altman and T.G. Townsend) is now more than 
ten years old. Secondly, the data for these models was collected on United States companies. 
Thirdly, it was implicitly assumed that a model developed on the basis of data relating to the year 
immediately preceding bankruptcy would perform well when applied to years prior to this. 
Data was collected for fifty-one pairs of failed and non-failed companies. The technique of 
multiple discriminant analysis was used to analyse twenty-four potentially discriminating ratios and 
develop a model ultimately utilising six of these ratios. This model could accurately classify 82 per-
cent of companies in the year prior to bankruptcy, 88 per-cent two years prior, 76 per-cent three 
years prior, and 62 per-cent four years prior. Previously, the most accurate level of classification 
for companies four years prior to bankruptcy was less than 30 per-cent. 
The study was concluded with suggestions for further research, in particular the 
applicability of multiple discriminant analysis to the three-group situation where the possible 
scenarios would be continued solvency, bankruptcy and acquisition. 
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PREFACE 
 
This study is concerned with identification of some of those variables which characterise a 
company as it approaches corporate death. It is based on the collection and computation of empirical 
data and is designed to present a model of possible use to all corporate interest groups. 
The author acknowledges the assistance and encouragement received from his supervisor, 
Mr. G.A. Luffman, in the preparation of this dissertation. 
The author would also like to express his appreciation to the directors of Extel Statistical 
Services Limited, for the extended use of their library services. 
Part of the database was collected in co-operation with F. Kuhn, B.Sc., currently engaged 
in the preparation of an MBA dissertation at the University of Bradford Management Centre. 
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1.1 The Interest Groups of a Company 
The form of the vehicle by which business has typically been transacted has continuously 
evolved since man first began to appreciate the economic arguments for the division and 
specialisation of labour. The self-financed sole-trader was replaced in turn as the principle 
economic unit by the partnership, the externally financed unlimited liability company and the 
publicly quoted limited liability company. Simultaneously, the typical size of an economic unit 
was increasing, whether measured in terms of the value of the assets managed, the volume of 
turnover, or the number of people with which the unit interacted. This evolutionary process is 
detailed, by Kempner, MacMillan and Hawkins (Kempner, T., MacMillan, K., and Hawkins, K., 
1974). 
It is the last of the measures of size mentioned above that is of special concern to us here. 
Business enterprises do not operate in a vacuum, and numerous authors have both catalogued 
corporate interest groups and argued that the objectives of such interest groups are today of 
increasing importance. Such authors include Steiner (Steiner, G.A., 1975) and Lowes (Lowes, B., 
1977), and among the interest groups that they mention are: 
(i) shareholders  (v) government 
(ii) creditors  (vi) suppliers 
(iii) employees  (vii) local communities 
(iv) management (viii) the public at large. 
These and similar arguments have led to the development of a "stakeholder" theory of the 
firm, as opposed to the more traditional "shareholder" theory. Writers on business policy such as 
Ansoff (Ansoff, H.I., 1968) and Argenti (Argenti, J., 1974) have been particularly concerned with 
the degree of priority that should be attached to non-shareholder objectives during the decision-
making process in management, but regardless of how precisely decisions are made in a particular 
company, it is apparent that a larger number of people are currently interested in the corporate 
behaviour of companies than has ever been the case in the past. 
The objectives of a company's varying interest groups are unlikely to be identical. For 
example, the prime objective of management might be a continuing growth in assets controlled, 
thereby justifying a similar growth in their salaries and adding to their prestige; the prime 
objective of employees might be security of employment; and the prime objective of creditors 
might be the prompt repayment of interest and capital on outstanding debt. An implicit 
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assumption underlying each of these examples, however, is the continued trading of the company 
on a successful basis, i.e. the long-term continuance of sufficient profits to avoid liquidation. 
It might be argued against this generalisation that a resident near to, for example, a 
factory producing fertiliser would be more concerned with the elimination of the dual risks of 
pollution and explosion, and thus not averse to the closure of such a factory. If adequate 
protection and safeguards cannot be installed the location of such a factory at an alternative site 
should indeed be considered, but if safety standards can be met the resident may well choose not 
to petition for the factory's removal given a potential decrease in the wealth of the local 
community due to increased unemployment if it were to close. In either case, the survival of the 
firm remains an important consideration. We may thus state that survival is an objective of the 
firm to which most, if not all, of its interest groups are likely to attach considerable importance. 
Adequate warning of the possibility of a firm not surviving could result in the occurrence of a 
number of events. Firstly, due to their proximity to possibly relevant information, the 
management can take steps to ensure that corrective or remedial action is taken, often before other 
interest groups have even appreciated that such a situation has arisen. Secondly, if the warning is 
recognised by other interest groups each can take action that it deems to be appropriate. For 
example, shareholders might cease to provide funds by declining to participate in new equity 
issues, creditors might seek senior status or higher interest rates for new debt, and employees look 
for alternative work. The precise action taken in each case would, of course, depend largely on the 
seriousness of the problem as indicated by the warning signal and subsequent investigation. 
If one accepts the importance of warning signals to corporate interest groups one is 
inevitably led to ask the question, "What form might such warning signals take?" There is no 
simple answer to such a question, mainly due to the fact that the theory of the firm has yet to 
reach the stage at which the optimal structure of a firm in terms of its assets, management, 
finances, etc., can be stated with any degree of accuracy. It may, however, be possible to compare 
the structure of a company in which we are particularly interested with the structure of similar 
companies which have in the past operated successfully or, indeed, with the same company during 
preceding periods. By noting striking similarities or dissimilarities it may be possible to state that 
the company of interest strongly resembles in some respects other companies that have, in the 
past, either continued to trade successfully, or entered into liquidation. It may also be possible, 
under certain circumstances, to go further than this and state that due to this resemblance the 
company of interest is either likely to survive or, alternatively, face corporate death. 
Ideally, in seeking to make such a comparison we should like to examine all the facets of 
a firm's structure, for example, the-education and experience of its management team, the 
proneness of its labour force to industrial disputes, its methods of raising capital, and many others. 
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Unfortunately, however, the proportion, of such information readily available to the majority of 
interest groups is extremely limited, amounting to little more than balance sheet, profit and loss, 
and equity data for recent years, and Chairmen's statements. It should also be noted that even if 
data were readily available on, for example, management experience, such data might he 
extremely difficult to quantify effectively. 
We have already noted that the most readily available data on companies is financial in 
nature. The Companies Acts and their Amendments have ensured that companies are required to 
disclose their accounts in ever-increasing detail. Although some might argue that disclosure levels 
still have some way to go, it cannot he denied that a large volume of financial data is available to 
any reader of a publicly quoted company's Annual Report and Accounts. It is for this reason that 
we next consider the history of ratio analysis and some of the empirical studies that have been 
carried out on this subject. 
1.2 Ratio Analysis 
To begin from a negative point of view, and to quote (Horrigan, J.O., 1968), "... the most 
striking aspect of the present state of ratio analysis is the absence of an explicit theoretical 
structure." In the last ten years, this criticism has not been significantly allayed, yet a need does 
exist for analytical devices that can enable analysts to compare corporate performance over time 
periods and between firms. The ratio fulfils that need, as a quick and simple method of 
comparison. 
1.21 Historical Background 
The introduction of financial statement analysis can be traced back to North America 
during the industrial boom which occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Almost 
from the beginning ratio analysis began to develop along two parallel paths. Credit analysis 
concentrated on the development of measures of the ability to repay the interest and capital of 
debt, whereas managerial analysis concentrated on the development of measures of profitability. 
This is an example of the differing informational needs of a firm's varying interest groups, the 
former approach being of principle interest to creditors such as bankers and suppliers and the 
latter to such groups as management and shareholders. To the extent that the former approach 
predominated, one should chiefly examine credit analysis to appreciate the evolution of ratio 
analysis in general. 
Commercial banks began to request financial statements for lending purposes as early as 
the 1870s and, within twenty years, the flow of data had increased to the level where a columnar 
form of balance sheet presentation was desirable, with the segregation of current from non-current 
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items. Thus, by the 1890s, it was possible for an analyst to compare current assets with current 
liabilities and the current ratio was born. 
During the period between the turn of the century and the end of the First World War, the 
number of ratios described proliferated, although usage did not increase at the same pace. The 
current ratio was used, however, and the 2 to 1 criteria began to become generally accepted. A 
need became apparent for the collection and publication of data to facilitate interfirm comparison 
by the development of empirical ratio criteria. A further important development at this time was 
the attempt by Du Pont to develop a hierarchical structure of ratios that would provide a suitable 
framework for systemised ratio analysis. 
The following decade of the 1920s saw an increase in both the numbers of publications on 
ratio analysis and the amount of data collected. What appears to have been the first attempt to 
develop a linear discriminant function was also undertaken during this period by Wall (Wall, A., 
1919). Charges also began to be levelled against ratios at this time, among them: (i) their changes 
over time cannot be interpreted because the numerator and denominator both vary; (2) they are 
"artificial" measures; (3) they divert the analyst's attention from a comprehensive view of the 
firm; and (4) their reliability as indicators varies widely between ratios (Horrigan, J.O, op cit). 
Despite such criticisms, interest in ratios continued unabated and during the 1930s the 
first serious studies on the predictive ability of ratios using control groups were published. It is to 
a discussion of such studies that we must now turn. 
1.2.2 Univariate Studies 
Univariate analysis is the use of financial ratios taken one at a time in order to predict 
whether or not a given company is a member of some predetermined class of companies. For 
example, one might seek to use the ratio of cash flow to total debt in order to determine whether a 
company is likely to enter into liquidation or remain solvent A most useful essay on the subject of 
univariate studies in relation to impending failure is that of Dev (Dev, S., 1974). This work 
includes a summary table reproduced here as Table 1.1. 
The second of the two FitzPatrick studies (FitzPatrick, P.J., 1932) compared thirteen 
ratios for each of nineteen failed companies with those of nineteen successful companies. Three 
ratios in particular were noted as being particularly good discriminators Criticisms of this study 
include the limited sample size and the lack of a definition of failure. 
The Smith and Winakor study (Smith, R.F. and Winakor, A.H, 1935) extended earlier 
work carried out by Smith and examined changes in the ratios of 183 firms over four to ten years 
prior to failure. They concluded that the overall results were similar to those of Smith's earlier 
research, thus there were certain ratios "... whose trends resulted in an uninterrupted indication or 
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symptom of weakness for the majority of companies in at least the last eight years before failure." 
(Smith, R.F., 1930). Notwithstanding this, they discovered substantial variations in the ratios 
when the data were analysed according to industry and firm size. A criticism of this study was the 
lack of a control group with which to compare the results. 
The Ramser and Foster study (Ramser, J.R., and Foster, L.C., 1931) examined ratios 
calculated from the balance sheets of companies applying for permission to sell securities over a 
ten-year period in the State of Illinois. The companies were divided into those which had 
subsequently failed and those which continued to survive. A number of ratios were found to differ 
significantly between these groups, although a criticism must be that the best discriminators were 
not in fact stated, merely the thirteen "most significant" ratios. 
The Merwin study (Merwin, C.L. 1942) analysed a large number of ratios calculated from 
the accounts of 581 "continuing" and "discontinuing" small businesses. Three ratios proved to be 
significant discriminators between continuance and discontinuance, up to five years prior to the 
event. 
The Tamari study (Tamari, M., 1964) compared ten ratios calculated from the accounts of 
twenty-eight industrial companies with those for all Israeli industry. He found that the failed 
company ratios were significantly worse than the all-industry ratios in the year prior to failure, 
and that most had been deteriorating for up to five years prior. However, he also concluded that 
"... the analyst cannot rely on one ratio alone in measuring the degree of risk". He therefore 
attempted to develop a linear discriminant function in order to better measure risk. It should also 
be noted that this is the only major univariate study mentioned in this section to have been 
undertaken outside of the United States. 
Finally, in this section, we must consider the Beaver study (Beaver, WH., 1966) which 
compared six ratios of seventy-nine companies that failed with a similar number of non-failed 
companies. His study was similar to earlier work in that it confirmed the less satisfactory nature of 
each ratio for the failed compared to the non-failed companies for up to five years prior to failure, 
but differed in that cash flow ratios were tested for the first time with one in particular proving to 
be a good discriminator. 
With the exception of the last part of the Tamari study, each of the other studies in this 
section has dealt purely with univariate analysis techniques. It is necessary next to consider the 
multivariate approach to financial ratio analysis. 
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Smith & Ramser &
Author and Year of Publication Smith Winakor Foster Merwin Tamari Beaver
1931 1932 1930 1935 1931 1942 1964 1966 & 68
Current Asset and Liability Ratios
Current x x
Quick or 'Acid Test' 4th x x
Stock/Current Assets x
Capital Structure Ratios
Net Worth/Total Liabilities 3rd x x x
Net Worth/Total Assets             (a) x
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 3rd
Net Worth/Fixed Assets 2nd x x x x
Reserves/Total Assets x
Asset Structure Ratios
Fixed Assets/Total Assets x x
Current Assets/Fixed Assets      (a) x
Working Capital/Total Assets x Best x Best
Net Profit Ratios
Net Profit/Net Worth Best x x
Net Profit/Total Assets x 2nd






Cash Flow/Total Debt Best
Other Data
Number of Ratios Tested 13 13 24 21 33 Many 10 30
Number of Failed Companies 20 20 29 183 51 (b) 200 28 29
Years in which Failures Occurred 1920-29 1920-29 1923-28 1923-31 1920-27 1926-36 1958-60 1954-64
Country Studied USA USA USA USA USA USA Israel USA
(a) To facilitate comparison with the original studies, equivalent ratios have been bracketed together rather than given a
      single description.
(b) This is an approximation as the exact information was not given in the study.
Source: Dev, S., in Debits, Credits, Finance, and Profits (1974).
Fitzpatrick
TABLE 1.1
Ratios Shown to be Good Discriminators between Failed and Non-Failed Companies in Univariate Studies
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1.2.3 Multivariate Studies 
Multivariate analysis is the use of financial ratios, each with a certain weighting, taken 
simultaneously in order to predict whether or not a given company is a member of some 
predetermined class of companies. Its advantage lies in the fact that, as pointed out by Tamari 
(Tamari, N., op cit), it is not always clear as to the relative importance of ratios when attempting a 
classification between groups. 
Models may basically be developed in two ways: (i) on the basis of a priori expectations, 
or some theoretical justification; or (2) on the basis of a statistical technique such as multiple 
discriminant analysis (described, in detail in Section 2.1), applied to collected empirical data. In 
either case, once such a model has been developed its ability to classify companies correctly may 
be investigated using statistical tests. Each of the models described here is of the second type and, 
with the exception of the last two, for reasons given later, their results are summarised in Table 
1.2 reproduced from Dev (Dev, S., op cit) as later adapted by Townsend (Townsend, T.G., 1973). 
The first study undertaken to investigate the discriminatory power of financial ratios 
utilising multiple discriminant analysis was that of Altman (Altman. E.I., 1968). He used this 
technique to compare twenty-two ratios of thirty-three manufacturing companies that failed, and a 
similar number of paired non-failed companies. The model he developed consisted of five ratios 
which were not the same five as had proved to be the best predictors when considered on a 
univariate basis. Nevertheless, his model predicted failure more accurately than did any single 
ratio. A later study by Altman on railroad companies indicated that the appropriateness of a model 
is limited by the industry group of companies from which the initial data is drawn (Altman E.I., 
1971). Due to the considerable importance of the first study it will be referred to extensively in 
Chapter III. 
The Edminster study (Edminster, R.D., 1971) examined the ratios of twenty-one loss 
borrowers and a similar number of non-loss borrowers, each of which had received either a loan 
or a loan guarantee from the U.S. Small Business Administration. Tests indicated that the desired 
linear discriminant function, containing seven variables, predicted failure more successfully than 
did any single ratios and that a variable which when taken alone was not a significant predictor 
could add significant discriminatory quality to a function containing other variables. 
The Blum study (Blum, N., 1974) involved the analysis of 115 failed and 115 non-failed 
firms. In its final form the model developed contained twelve ratios, the coefficients of which 
were calculated for various previous years data. Discrimination was not found to be statistically 
significant at the sixth year prior to failure. 
The Gru study (Gru, L.G., 1973) was designed to develop a model capable of predicting 
the failure of small businesses in the U.S. His primary sample consisted of thirty-four failed and 
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thirty-four non-failed firms. The model contained five ratios and performed well in the year prior 
to failure, with both primary and secondary samples (the latter comprising a further twenty-eight 
companies). 
The Taffler and Tisshaw study (Taffler, H., and Tishaw, H., 1977) considered a sample of 
forty-six failing and forty-six non-failing companies, matched by size and industry. From eighty 
potentially discriminatory ratios four were obtained that enabled them to predict with 98% 
accuracy the classification of their initial sample one year prior to failure. Although the relative 
importance of each ratio is given, the actual coefficients and the constant corrective term are not, 
making further comment difficult. A second model developed specifically for unquoted 
companies is also mentioned in the study, although again no details are given. 
The Townsend study (Townsend T.G., 1978) comprised a primary sample of twenty-five 
failed companies, twenty-five acquired companies, and twenty-five non-failed companies. 
Utilising a modified form of the Altman model, he managed to discriminate satisfactorily between 
failed and non-failed companies in the year prior to failure and, when combined with the 
hypothesis that comparisons of means should be undertaken on norms calculated for the years 
prior to failure, was able to extend this order of accuracy up to three years prior to failure. A 
summary of these results is incorporated in Table 1.2 and again we shall he referring to this model 
extensively in later chapters. The model was not able to satisfactorily discriminate between 
acquired and non-failed companies and did not seek to attempt to discriminate between failed and 
acquired companies. This latter criticism is also true of the following study. 
The Belkaoui study (Belkaoui, A., 1978), carried out in Canada, compared the ratios of 
twenty-five acquired and twenty-five non-acquired companies on both a univariate and a 
multivariate basis. The latter approach, utilising a model comprising sixteen ratios, was shown to 
be superior to that of any single ratio, especially in the fifth year prior to acquisition. This result 
apparently reflected that obtained by Vance (Vance, J., 1969) on similar research carried out in 
the United States. 
The Fadel study (Fadel, H.A.H., 1977) differs from the other studies mentioned in this 
section in that it seeks to relate return on investment to liquidity, cash flow, and profitability ratios 
by means of a multiple regression technique. As such it may be considered to bear a greater 
resemblance to the PIMS study (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) that is described in Section 
2.1 rather than to the studies based on the use of multiple discriminant analysis considered here, 
and its use would seem to be of more limited value to corporate interest groups than such studies. 
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Author and Year of Publication Tamari Altman Edminster Blum Gru Townsend
1964 1935 1931 1974 1973 1978
Current Asset and Liability Ratios
Current x
Quick (Firm/Industry Average) x
Net Quick Assets/Stock x
Trend Breaks of Net Quick Assets/Stock (a) x
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes + Depreciation/ x
    Total Debt
Capital Structure Ratios
Net Worth/Total Liabilities x
Reserves/Total Assets x x
Current Liabilities/Net Worth x
Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities (b) x x
Total Debt/Total Assets x
Asset Structure Ratios
Working Capital/Total Assets x x x x
Net Profit Ratios
Profit Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets x x x
Profit Trend x
Rate of Return on Equity (b) x
Cash Flow Ratios
Cash Flow/Current Liabilities x
Cash Flow/Total Debt x
Sales and Cost of Sales Ratios
Stock/Sales x




Value of Production/Stock (c) x
Value of Production/Working Capital (c) x
Other Data
Number of Ratios Tested 10 22 14 12 21 5
Number of Failed Companies 28 33 21 115 34 35
Years in which Failures Occurred 1958-60 1946-65 1958-65 1954-68 1965-67 1967-75
Country Studied Israel USA USA USA USA USA
(a) A trend break is defined as any performance by a variable less favourable in one year than in the preceding year.
(b) These are the only ratios referred to here that are not calculated wholly from accounting data..
(c) Value of Production = sales + change in stocks of finished goods and work in progress.
Adapted from: Dev, S., (1974); and Townsend, T.G., (1978).
TABLE 1.2
Ratios Shown to be Good Discriminators between Failed and Non-Failed Companies in Multivariate Studies
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1.2.4 Judgemental Studies 
As has been stated earlier, these are studies which attempt to develop a linear discriminant 
function on the basis of a priori expectations, or some theoretical justification. The only recent 
study of this nature to have been undertaken in the United Kingdom is that of Argenti (Argenti, J., 
1976). His was an attempt to take into account non-balance sheet items such as management skills 
and employee morale. In a later article (Argenti, J., 1977), he argued that although his model had 
no statistical justification, it would help corporate interest groups in their quest for knowledge on 
the future state of the company by easing the quantification of essentially subjective information 
available to them in addition to financial information. He accepts that his model would probably 
be of most benefit when taken in conjunction with a second, statistically justified model based on 
financial ratio analysis, such as that of Altman. 
1.3 Summary 
This chapter has been concerned with the importance of survival as a prime objective 
across the whole spectrum of corporate interest groups. It was noted that the most extensive 
source of information readily available to such groups is the financial statements section of a 
company's Annual Report and Accounts and that it is not, therefore, surprising that financial ratio 
analysis has received considerable attention as a potential means of predicting failure. 
A review of univariate and multivariate studies indicates that the latter approach in 
particular shows considerable promise in failure predictions, although as stated by Townsend 
(Townsend, T.G., op cit), the three-year period prior to bankruptcy which seems to be the limit at 
which conveniently handled models predict failure with any degree of accuracy may be 
insufficient time for a large, modern corporation to significantly alter its product-market strategies 
and thus avoid failure. Similarly, other interest groups than management may not be able to act in 
sufficient time to protect their investments, livelihoods, or whatever. 
Before this work attempts to develop a group of models relevant to United Kingdom 
companies, and thereby improve this situation, it will be necessary to review briefly the statistical 
technique of multiple discriminant analysis and the computer program known as the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences, which is used in subsequent data handling. 
The uniqueness of this study will be in its attempt to produce a set of four models, each 
containing a manageable number of variables, relevant to the study of companies in the four-year 
period prior to their possible failure. The reasons for attempting to develop a set of four models 
rather than a single model are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 
 
2.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis is one of a class of statistical techniques also including factor 
analysis and regression that can be used in the development of mathematical models. Whereas 
regression seeks to relate the variation in one variable with that of one or more other variables 
(that is, simple or multiple regression respectively), discriminant analysis seeks to distinguish a 
set of cases between the membership of two or more groups. The distinction between the two 
techniques may become clearer if we briefly consider an example of each. 
The general form of a model developed using multiple regression is of the form: 
Y = a0 + a1X1 + a2X2 + … + anXn 
Y is known as the dependent variable and, once the model has been developed, that is, after the 
value of the constant term a0 and the coefficients a1 to an of the n independent variables X1 to Xn 
have been estimated, it is possible to calculate an estimated value of Y given knowledge of the 
actual values of the n independent variables. 
An application of multiple regression in the field of financial analysis is illustrated by the 
PIMS study (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) carried out at the Harvard Business School in 
association with the Marketing Science Institute (Schoeffler, S., Buzzell, R.D., and Heany, D.F., 
1974). This study attempted to relate the return on investment of 620 industrial businesses with 
such independent variables as market share, investment ratio, size, and degree of diversity. The 
model was developed to the point where thirty-seven independent variables were included and 
eighty per cent of the variation in return on investment, the dependent variable, could he 
explained. 
The general form of a model developed using multiple discriminant analysis is of the 
form: 
Z = c0 + c1X1 + c2X2 + … + cnXn 
Z is known as the discriminant score and, once the model has been developed, that is, after the 
value of the constant term c0 and the coefficients c1 to cn of the n discriminating variables X1 to Xn 
have been estimated, it is possible to determine a value for Z given knowledge of the actual values 
of the n discriminatory variables and thereby to classify the given case within one or other of a 
predetermined number of groups. The details of this procedure are explained in Section 2.3. 
A two-group example of the use of discriminant analysis is the study carried out by 
Heyck and Klecka (Heyck, T.W., and Klecka, W., 1973), which attempted to distinguish between 
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membership of the Radical and Traditional factions of the Liberal Members of the British 
Parliament during the period 1874 to 1895. The factional loyalty of about half the Liberal 
Members of Parliament had been identified from available historical materials, but this left a large 
proportion for whom the available material provided no clues, or contradictory clues, as to their 
partisan alignment. Multiple discriminant analysis was used to classify this latter group of 
Liberals into the Radical or the Traditional faction. The discriminating variables used in this 
instance were votes cast in Parliament, in particular those related to the Radical programme, thus 
minimising the influence of irrelevant differences between the behaviour of the known Radicals 
and the known Traditionalists. The analysis was considered successful to the extent that the 
discriminant function obtained could explain more than eighty per cent of the variation between 
the two groups. 
A more detailed discussion of the terms encountered in discriminant analysis and the 
limitations inherent in the technique is included in Section 2.3. This study does not incorporate a 
derivation of the discriminate function coefficients, which is well described in a number of 
multivariate statistics texts, for example see "Multivariate Data Analysis" (Cooley, W.W., and 
Lohnes, P.R., 1971). 
2.2 The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences – Introduction 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is an integrated system of 
computer programs developed principally at the University of Chicago and designed for the 
analysis of social science data. The criteria that its compilers have attempted to satisfy have been 
summarised as: 
(1) that the statistical procedures be mathematically and statistically correct; 
(2) that the program design and code be computationally efficient; 
(3) that the logic and syntax of the system parallel the way in which social scientists 
approach data, analysis; and 
(4) that the system provides statistical procedures and data-management facilities tailored 
to the particular needs of empirical social researchers. 
(Hie, N.H., Hull, C.H., Jenkins, J.G., Steinbrenner, K., and Bent, D.., 1975). 
The widespread use of SPSS in both America and the United Kingdom implies that these 
criteria have been successfully met and the considerable documentation available ensures facility 
of use even by researchers with minimal computing experience, such as the author of this study. It 
was therefore with some confidence that SPSS was chosen as the means of analysing the 
empirical data collected during this study. 
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SPSS is available in a number of versions, differing in the level of complexity of the 
statistical analyses that they offer. The version used in this study was Version Six, as run at the 
University of Manchester Regional Computing Centre, since Version Four, available at the 
University of Bradford Computing Centre, does not incorporate the discriminate analysis 
subprogram. It is to a discussion of the discriminate analysis subprogram, and its relationship to 
the details of the technique of multiple discriminate analysis that we must now turn. 
2.3 The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences – Subprogram Discriminant 
The following six sub-sections discuss the major statistical components of the technique 
of multiple discriminant analysis and their context in subprogram discriminant. 
2.3.1 Determining the Number of Discriminating Functions. 
The minimum number of discriminant functions that may be derived in an analysis is 
equal to the number of discriminating variables, or one less than the number of groups. Thus, a 
maximum of one function could be derived from data attempting to discriminate between two 
groups, and two functions in the case of three groups, given sufficient discriminating variables in 
each instance (i.e. two and three respectively). In practice one might find that, for example, two 
functions are quite adequate for discriminating between four groups. This can occur when the last 
one (or more) functions do not disappear mathematically due to sampling and measurement 
errors, even though it does not exist as a separate dimension in the population. 
Subprogram discriminant provides two measures for judging the importance of 
discriminating functions along with associated statistics. The first is the relative percentage of the 
eigenvalue associated with the function. The eigenvalue is a measure computed in the process of 
deriving the discriminant function and is a measure of the relative importance of that function. 
The sum of eigenvalues is a measure of the total variance existing in the discriminating variables. 
The associated statistic used in judging the importance of a discriminant function is the canonical 
correlation, of which the square may be interpreted as the proportion of variance in the 
discriminant function explained by the groups. 
The second measure automatically computed by the program is Wilk's lambda. This is an 
inverse measure of the discriminating power in the original variables which has not yet been 
removed by the discriminant functions (i.e. the larger is lambda, the less the information that 
remains). Lambda can be transformed into a chi-square statistic for an easy test of statistical 
significance. It may also be noted that even in a situation where only two groups exist, it is useful 
to be able to compare levels of statistical significance, for example, when the ability to 
discriminate between two groups is being compared over time. 
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2.3.2 Interpretation of the Discriminant Function Coefficients 
The standardised discriminant function coefficients are used to compute the discriminant 
score for a case in which the original discriminating variables are in standard form (i.e. for each 
variable the value of the mean of that variable as obtained from the sample is subtracted and the 
resultant divided by the sample standard deviation). The discriminant score is obtained by 
multiplying each discriminating variable by its corresponding coefficient and adding together 
these products. Thus, rather than our original expression for Z, i.e. 
Z = c0 + c1X1 + c2X2 + … + cnXn 
we would have 
Z = k1X1 + k2X2 + … + knXn 
where Zn = (Xn - Ẍn)/(sn/(m-1)1/2) 
Ẍn = sample mean of the nth variable 
sn = unbiased standard deviation of the nth variable 
m = number of observations in sample. 
The standardised discriminant coefficients, k1 to kn, are derived in such a way that, over all the 
cases in the analysis, the score from one function will have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of unity. Thus, any single score represents the number of standard deviations that case is 
away from the means for all cases on the given discriminant function. 
By averaging the scores for the cases within a particular group, we arrive at the group 
mean on the respective function. For a single group, the means on all the functions are referred to 
as the group centroid, which is the most typical location of a case from that group in the 
discriminant function space. A comparison of the group means on each function tells us how far 
apart the groups are along that dimension. 
The standardised discriminant function coefficients are of great analytic importance in 
and of themselves. When the sign is ignored, each coefficient represents the relative contribution 
of its associated variable to that function. The interpretation is analogous to the interpretation of 
beta weights in multiple regression. 
Since discriminating variables are rarely coded in standard form, the standardised 
discriminant function coefficients are of little computational use. The option exists of calculating 
the unstandardised coefficients, which are multiplied by the raw values of the associated variables 
to arrive at a discriminant score. After adding a constant to adjust for the grand means, a score is 
obtained which is identical to that computed from standardised data and standardised coefficients. 
The unstandardised coefficients do not reflect the relative importance of the variables since they 
have not been adjusted for the measurement scales and variability in the original variables. 
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2.3.3 Plots of Discriminant Scores 
Subprogram discriminant will produce plots of the cases along the discriminant functions 
in the form of a histogram. Examination of such plots is particularly useful in studying the 
separation of the group centroids and their relative locations, and another advantage is in 
observing the degree to which the groups actually overlap. 
2.3.4 Classification of Cases 
By classification is meant the process of identifying the likely group membership of a 
case when the only information known is the case's values on the discriminating variables. 
Another use of classification is in testing the adequacy of the derived discriminant functions. By 
classifying the cases used to derive the functions in the first place and comparing predicted group 
membership with actual group membership, one can empirically measure the success in 
discrimination by observing the proportion of correct classifications. 
Classification is achieved through the computation of a series of classification functions, 
one for each group. Resulting classification coefficients are multiplied by the raw variable values, 
summed together and added onto a constant. A case is then classified into the group on whose 
classification function it receives the highest score. As with unstandardised discriminant 
coefficients such classification coefficients and scores are optional output on subprogram 
discriminant. 
2.3.5 Selection Methods 
The criteria by which independent variables are selected for inclusion in the analysis is 
controlled by the user. Six methods are available: all independent variables may he entered 
concurrently through the direct method, or variables may be entered singly or in specified groups 
through five stepwise methods. 
In the direct method discriminant functions are created directly from the entire set of 
independent variables, regardless of the discriminating power of each of the independent 
variables. This method is appropriate when for theoretical reasons the researcher wishes to have 
all the independent variables entered in the analysis and is not interested in seeing intermediate 
results based on subsets of the independent variables. 
Stepwise selection methods begin by choosing the single variable which has the highest 
value on the selection criterion chosen. This initial variable is then paired with each of the other 
available variables, one at a time, and the selection criterion is computed. The new variable which 
in conjunction with the initial variable produces the best criterion is selected as the second 
variable to enter the model. This procedure of locating the next variable that would yield the best 
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criterion score, given the variables already selected, continues until all variables are selected, or 
no additional variables provide a minimum level of improvement 
As variables are selected for inclusion, some variables previously selected may lose their 
discriminating power. This occurs because the information they contain about group differences is 
now available in some combination of the other included variables. Such variables are redundant 
and should be eliminated. Thus, at the beginning of each step, each of the previously selected 
variables is tested to determine if it still makes a sufficient contribution to discrimination. If any 
are eligible for removal, the least useful is eliminated. A variable which has been removed at one 
step may re-enter at a later step if it satisfies the selection criterion at that time. 
The criteria that may be used in the stepwise mode are: 
(1) the largest overall multivariate F ratio for the test of differences among group centroids, 
thereby also minimising Wilk's lambda;  
(2) the maximum Mahalanobis distance between the two closest groups; 
(3) the maximum smallest F ratio between pairs of groups, which reduces to the same 
criterion as (2) when the groups are of equal size; 
(4) the minimum residual variation between groups; and 
(5) the largest increase in Rao's V statistic. 
For each of the above criteria a variable is only considered for selection if its partial 
multivariate F ratio is larger than a specified value. In addition, variables are tested for removal 
only on the basis of their partial multivariate F ratio. The partial F ratio measures the 
discrimination introduced by the variable after taking into account the discrimination achieved by 
the other selected variables. The user has the option of altering the F values for which variables 
are permitted to enter or leave the analysis. 
Due to the fact that not every possible subset of variables is considered, the use of a stepwise 
procedure results in the selection of an optimal rather than a maximal set of discriminating 
variables in the final model. Because of the vast numbers of such subsets that would have to be 
considered in a full analysis comprising more than just a few variables such a solution is 
considered to be an efficient approximation. 
When a stepwise analysis is performed and the user wishes certain variables to be entered into 
the analysis before others, or where control of the entire selection sequence is desired, inclusion 
levels can be specified for each variable. It should also be noted that the sequence in which 
variables are selected is not necessarily the same as their relative importance as discriminators, a 
point which is returned to later. 
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2.3.6 Options Available on Subprogram Discriminant 
Each of the SPSS subprograms has associated with it a number of options. In the case of 
subprogram Discriminant the options relevant to this study are: 
(1) Inclusion of cases with missing data. This option is particularly important in that it 
facilitates classification of cases where group membership is not specified, thus allowing 
easy validation of primary samples by secondary samples. 
(2) Printout of classification results tables. This is a table indicating for each group the 
number of cases classified into each group and the percent correct classification for the 
known groups. 
(3) Printout of discriminant scores and classification information. This is done for each case. 
The output includes: case identification by sequence numbers; the group number the case 
actually belongs to; the group number of the closest group (G); the probability of a case in 
group G being that far from the centroid; the probability of membership of the second 
closest group (if greater than 0.0005) and its number; and the discriminant scores. 
(4) Printout of a single plot of cases, or a separate plot for each group. If there is only one 
discriminant function this plot is a histogram of the distribution of the cases along the 
function. When there are two or more functions, a scatterplot based on the first two 
discriminant functions is printed. 
(5) Printout of unstandardised discriminant function coefficients and of classification 
functions. 
(6) Printout of means and standard deviations for each of the discriminating variables for 
each group and for the total set of cases. 
(7) Printout of univariate F ratios. This is a one-way analysis of variance test for equality of 
group means on a single discriminating variable. 
2.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a brief explanation of the aims and 
limitations of the technique of multiple discriminant analysis in general,and subprogram 
Discriminant of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences in particular, it has not been 
intended to be a mathematically orientated introduction to the subject of discriminant analysis for 
reasons already given. Inevitably, the material comprising this chapter has been drawn extensively 
from Chapter 23 of the SPSS manual (Klecka, W.R., 1975). 
It is now possible to progress to consider the method by which the sample for analysis 
was prepared, the collection and computation of the empirical data, and the results of the analysis. 
 









3.1 Introduction to Methodology 
The purpose of this Chapter is to describe the development of a set of validated predictive 
models based on the multiple discriminate analysis of selected financial ratios of United Kingdom 
companies in the recent past. The reason for the decision to develop separate models for each of 
the four years prior to bankruptcy investigated is detailed in Chapter 4. It is useful at this point to 
list the principal stages of the methodology: 
(1) assembly of working definitions; 
(2) selection of companies comprising samples; 
(3) collection of data on companies in the samples; 
(4) selection of ratios for entry into the analysis; 
(5) computation of ratios from collected data; 
(6) division of initial samples into primary and secondary samples; 
(7) development of models from primary sample data; and 
(8) validation of models from secondary sample data. 
 
3.2  Grouping Definitions 
In envisaging future scenarios for a given company, a number of alternatives may 
obviously exist. These alternatives may be classified under the following broad headings: (1) 
continued solvency; (2) competitive acquisition; (3) nationalisation; and (4) failure. 
Previous researchers have defined failure in a variety of ways, but the definition used here 
will be that due to Townsend (Townsend, op cit), that is ".. entry into receivership, compulsory 
winding up by order of the court, or creditors voluntary liquidation". Thus, failure is not used in 
the comparative sense of a firm not living up to the expectations of one or more of its interest 
groups. 
Under certain circumstances acquisition of a company by a competitor may be seen as an 
alternative to the failure of the acquired company, under the definition of failure given above. 
However, successful companies are also acquired and any random sample of acquired companies 
would be likely to contain examples of each type. Analysis of the situation in which acquisition 
was considered as a scenario would, therefore, necessarily require prior separation of such a 
sample into two groups: those considered to have been acquired due to the likelihood of their 
impending failure and those taken over on the basis of their being successful concerns. 
Regrettably, time limitations did not allow such a prior classification of a sample of acquired 





The Dynamics of Corporate Death – Page19 
companies to he carried out and it was decided not to incorporate a group of acquired companies 
in this study. 
The determinants of nationalisation, whether by direct means or the acquisition of a 
controlling interest by some body under government control such as the National Enterprise 
Board, are perhaps even more complex than the determinants of failure or acquisition. Almost 
certainly political as well as financial considerations will be of crucial importance and, of course, 
the former are not available as far as is known from balance sheet analysis. Partly for this reason 
and partly because the number of companies actually nationalised each year is very small, it was 
decided to exclude this group also from the study. 
For a company to be deemed solvent with respect to this study it must not have been 
classifiable under any of the three previous headings. Effectively this means that at the year in 
which its matching failed company entered into receivership or liquidation, it must still have been 
functioning as an independent, un-nationalised entity. Thus, solvency does not indicate any 
particular level of technical solvency as measured, for example, by its financial ratios. 
(It should be noted that a large number of companies receive some form of financial aid 
from the government without their being directly or effectively nationalised. Such aid can be 
extremely difficult to quantify, but as far as was possible the grosser examples have been 
excluded from the ultimately chosen sample of solvent companies). 
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
It was decided to attempt to obtain as large a sample as possible with a minimum target of 
fifty failed companies and an equal number of non-failed companies. For reasons explained in the 
following section the figure actually attained was fifty-one pairs of companies later divided into a 
primary sample comprising thirty-four pairs of companies and a secondary sample containing 
seventeen pairs of companies. 
3.3.1 Selection of Failed Companies 
As a potential source for the sample of failed companies two publications were 
considered. The first was the "Register of Defunct and Other Companies (Removed from the 
Stock Exchange Year Book)" and proved on detailed investigation not to present conveniently 
information on why companies had had their Stock Exchange listings removed in a manner 
compatible with the definition of failure adopted in this study. The second was the Extel 
Statistical Services Limited publication entitled "List of Securities of Negligible Value". The term 
"Negligible Value" refers to Section 23(4) of the Finance Act, 1965, which deals with securities 
agreed by the Inland Revenue to be of negligible value with respect to capital gains tax liabilities. 
This publication also contains a supplement listing companies that have entered into receivership 
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or liquidation and where no final distribution or declaration has been made. The main section of 
the publication lists 129 British registered companies and the supplement a further 111. Of this 
total of 240 failed companies, nearly three quarters fall into one of the following groups: 
(1) property, banking and insurance; 
(2) tea estates, South American railways, etc.; 
(3) companies failing before 1969; and 
(4) total asset size in year prior to failure under £1 million. 
It was decided to discard these companies on the following grounds: 
(1) Companies engaged in financial services may well exhibit different 
characteristics during the approach to failure than companies engaged primarily 
in manufacture or industrial services. 
(2) Companies whose main trading interests lie outside of the United Kingdom may 
well be subject to substantially different financial environments than those 
trading predominantly within the United Kingdom. 
(3) Financial disclosure requirements changed considerably in 1967 and any 
company failing before 1970 would be unlikely to have available all relevant data 
for the four years prior to failure. 
(4) The problem of widely varying asset size could be partially overcome through the 
development of separate models for companies whose assets lie in a given size 
range, but due to the relatively small number of failing publicly quoted 
companies with total assets of under £1 million it was decided to define an 
arbitrary boundary at this level and to use a paired-sample design, discussed fully 
in Section 3.3.2. (The criterion was eventually relaxed in the case of three 
companies in order to allow the sample size to attain its target of fifty pairs of 
companies.) 
It should be noted that the decision to investigate only publicly quoted companies stems 
from the large proportion of productive assets controlled by such companies in the United 
Kingdom, the relative ease with which financial data on such companies can be secured and the 
fact that the quoted Stock Market price has been shown in previous studies to constitute the basis 
of at least one successfully discriminating variable. 
The companies remaining after this initial pruning were examined in rather greater detail. 
The most common cause for removal from the potential sample group was lack of data in one or 
more years, most frequently sales turnover or security price range. There were also a number of 
companies which had not been in existence as publicly quoted companies for four years prior to 
their failure, or that had substantially changed the nature of their business. An example of the 
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latter was Automatic Oil Tools, which four years before its failure (i.e. before its involvement 
with Slater Walker) had been known as White City (Glasgow) and at that time had been in the 
business of managing a greyhound stadium, rather than industrial equipment manufacture. 
At this stage it became apparent that another planned approach would have to be dropped, 
the development of individually developed models for separate industrial sectors. From the point 
of view of this study it was considered unfortunate that simply not enough companies in a given 
industrial sector have failed in recent years to enable statistically meaningful analysis to be carried 
out. The introduction of dummy variables in order to cope with this problem was considered, but 
was eventually decided as being statistically unjustifiable and likely to detract from the ease of 
use of any models that might be developed. 
The final list of fifty-one companies that satisfied all inclusion criteria is given in Table 
3.1 along with their identification numbers. Information concerning the total assets and the 
turnover of these companies is given in Table 3.3. 
3.3.2 Selection of Non-Failed Companies 
In selecting the group of non-failed companies, it was decided to employ a paired-sample 
design. This type of design helps to provide some degree of control over factors that might 
otherwise affect the relationship under investigation, although it does prevent any inferences from 
being drawn concerning the predictive ability of such factors with respect to the relationship, in 
this case between financial data and failure. In this study the samples were initially paired, as far 
as was practicably possible, by two factors, asset size and industrial sector, both of which have 
already been mentioned as being possible determinants of propensity to failure. 
Pairing was carried out primarily with the aid of two publications, the Financial Times 
and the "Extel Handbook of Market Leaders". The latter publication, also published by Extel 
Statistical Services Limited, contains statistical data relating to and a brief description of the 
principle business of those firms comprising the Financial Times All Share index. Thus, a given 
failed company would first be identified according to the Financial Times share service 
classification and a list made of likely candidates for pairing appearing in the same class. Each 
member of this list would then be checked in the Extel Handbook to determine which came 
closest to the given failed company in terms of asset size and principle business. If a full set of 
data was found to be available for the four years prior to entry into receivership or liquidation of 
the failed company, it was accepted as a member of the sample of non-failed companies. 
The final list of fifty-one non-failed companies that satisfied all pairing criteria is given in 
Table 3.2 along with their identification numbers. Information concerning the total assets and the 
turnover of these companies is given in Table 3.3. 
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TABLE 3.1 
The Sample of Failed Companies 
 
Identity No. Company Allocation Paired Company 
1 A.D.M. Business Systems Primary 93 
2 Anglian Food Group Primary 88 
3 Austin (E.J.) International Secondary 94 
4 Bacal Construction Primary 63 
5 Bear Brand Primary 81 
6 Brayhead Secondary 78 
7 Brierleys Supermarkets Primary 82 
8 Brittain Group Primary 70 
9 Burnholme & Forder Secondary 72 
10 Bydand Primary 99 
11 C.B.R. Jersey (Holdings) Primary 64 
12 Century Securities Secondary 85 
13 Charles (David)  Primary 74 
14 Collett (J.) Primary 59 
15 Collier (S.) & Co. Secondary 77 
16 Conway Stewart & Co. Primary 86 
17 Court Line Primary 95 
18 Crowther & Nicholson Secondary 79 
19 Dallas (John E.) & Sons Primary 76 
20 Dimplex Industries Primary 101 
21 Fairey Co. Secondary 55 
22 Fairfax Jersey Group Primary 56 
23 F.P.E. Group Primary 71 
24 Goldring Secondary 75 
25 Heenan Spark Primary 97 
26 Highlight Sports Primary 96 
27 House of Sears (Holdings) Secondary 91 
28 Ireland (Ernest) Primary 57 
29 Kencast Primary 80 
30 Lawdon Secondary 53 
31 Lesbrook Primary 61 
32 Lewston International Primary 67 
33 Lines Bros. Secondary 83 
34 Mahoney (Martin) & Bros. Primary 73 
35 Metal Products Co. (Willenhall)  Primary 60 
36 Metal Traders Secondary 62 
37 Mitchell Construction Holdings Primary 58 
38 Motor Rail Primary 69 
39 Naylor (T. & A.) Secondary 92 
40 Northern Developments (Holding) Primary 84 
41 Penrad Group Primary 66 
42 Roadships Secondary 102 
43 Rosedale Industries Primary 98 
44 Spreckley (Charles) Industries Primary 90 
45 Stibbe (G.) & Co. Secondary 65 
46 T.C.K. Group Primary 100 
47 Telfer & Co. Primary 89 
48 Venesta International Secondary 52 
49 Wilson Lovatt & Sons Primary 87 
50 Wood (W.) & Son Primary 68 
51 Worth (Bond) Holdings Secondary 54 
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TABLE 3.2 
The Sample of Non-Failed Companies 
 
Identity No. Company Allocation Paired Company 
52 Aaranson Bros. Secondary 48 
53 Aberdeen Construction Group Secondary 30 
54 Allied Textile Secondary 51 
55 A.P.V. Holdings Secondary 21 
56 Atkins Bros. (Hosiery) Primary 22 
57 Barratt Developments Primary 28 
58 Benford Concrete Machinery Primary 37 
59 Bright (John) Group Primary 14 
60 Bruntons (Musselburgh) Primary 35 
61 Camford Engineering Primary 31 
62 Canning (W.) Secondary 36 
63 Capper-Neill Primary 4 
64 Cawdaw Industrial Holdings Primary 11 
65 Chamberlain Phipps Secondary 45 
66 Concentric Primary 41 
67 Costain (Richard) Primary 32 
68 Denbyware Primary 50 
69 Dowding & Mills Primary 38 
70 Edbro (Holdings) Primary 8 
71 Edwards (Louis G.) & Sons (Manchester) Primary 23 
72 Electrocomponents Secondary 9 
73 Ellis & Goldstein (Holdings) Primary 34 
74 Fairclough Construction Group Primary 13 
75 Parnell Electronics Primary 24 
76 Fidelity Radio Secondary 19 
77 Foster Bros. Clothing Co. Secondary 15 
78 Friedland Doggart Group Secondary 6 
79 Hagas (John) Secondary 18 
80 Hall (Matthew) Primary 29 
81 House of Lerose Primary 5 
82 Lennons Group Primary 7 
83 Lesney Products & Co. Secondary 33 
84 Lilley (F.J.C.) Primary 40 
85 Martin The Newsagent Secondary 12 
86 Mentmore Manufacturing Primary 16 
87 Monk (A.) Primary 49 
88 Morrisons (Wm.) Supermarkets Primary 2 
89 Pork Farms Primary 47 
90 Press (William) & Son Primary 44 
91 Ray-beck Secondary 27 
92 R.F.D. Group Secondary 39 
93 Rotork Primary 1 
94 Ruberoid Secondary 3 
95 Runciman (Walter) Primary 17 
96 Silhouette (London) Primary 26 
97 Simon Engineering Primary 25 
98 Transparent Paper Primary 43 
99 United Scientific Holdings Primary 10 
100 Wellman Engineering Corporation Primary 46 
101 Wolf Electric Tools (Holdings) Primary 20 
102 York Trailer Secondary 42 
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TABLE 3.3 
Statistical Data for the Samples of Failed and Non-Failed Companies 
Characteristic  Failed Non-Failed 
Mean Total Assets (£m) T-1 15.165 17.327 
(Standard Deviation)  (23.287) (24.619) 
 T-2 13.935 14.085 
  (20.617) (18.655) 
 T-3 8.317 11.547 
  (11.381) (15.145) 
 T-4 6.506 9.607 
  (9.168) (12.675) 
Mean Total Assets (£m) T-1 26.226 30.523 
(Standard Deviation)  (73.997) (42.774) 
 T-2 23.698 23.839 
  (74.641) (31.121) 
 T-3 15.569 19.910 
  (41.295) (25.659) 
 T-4 13.223 16.571 
  (36.048) (22.129) 
 
3.3.3 Implications of Selection and Pairing Criteria 
It is important to appreciate from the outset that any model developed on the basis of the 
samples of failed and non-failed companies used in this study will be of extremely limited 
applicability in a number of respects: 
(1) The model will relate only to the British economy over the time period 1966 to 
1977. 
(2) No inferences can be drawn as to the effect of asset size and industrial sector with 
regard to propensity to failure. 
It may be possible that such models could be re-validated for different economies, or over 
a different time period, but they should not be used for predictive purposes without such 
revalidation. 
 
3.4 Collection of Financial Data 
Except in an extremely limited number of cases where reference had to be made to copies 
of a company's Annual Report and Accounts for balance sheet or profit and loss account data, and 
the year-end edition of the Financial Times for equity information, all data was available from 
current and past cards of the Extol Company Card Service. Since past cards are not available at 
the libraries of the University of Bradford, Extel were approached and consented to allow the 
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examination of past cards held in their own library. If this facility had not been made available, it 
is almost certain that this study could not have been undertaken in the time available. 
At this point an item of terminology must be introduced. Companies that fail do so at 
varying times after the publication of their last Annual Report and Accounts and only very seldom 
is this time period exactly twelve months. To this extent, the designation of the year for which the 
last available report and accounts were published as "T-1" does not imply that failure occurred in 
year "T". The first, second and third years before the last year for which a report and accounts 
were published are similarly designated "T-2", "T-3" and "T-4" respectively. This virtually 
unavoidable in-exactitude with regard to time prior to failure automatically introduces an avenue 
by which error can enter into the analysis and may be one of the reasons that models already 
developed have failed to predict correctly in all cases, particularly when some method of 
attempting to determine time to failure is attempted. This error will unfortunately be present in 
models developed in this study since insufficient time was available to apply a correction and 
indeed it would have been impossible to have done so unless time units of less than one year's 
duration were considered. Even the latter approach would have been extremely difficult given the 
relatively smaller amount of information generally available in companies' interim figures. 
Another problem was encountered when attempting to collect data for years T-1 to T-4 
for the paired non-failed companies. Since a company's year-end may occur on any date between 
January 1st and December 31st, it is conceivable that, unless an implicit correction is made, T-1 
might represent a year end of January 1st 1977 for a given failed company and December 31st 
1977 for its paired non-failed company. Since pairing for time is deemed desirable in order to 
limit the effect on the model of exogeneous economic factors, such an explicit correction was 
made. In the example given above, T-1 for the paired non-failed company would have been taken 
as 1976. 
 
3.5  Data Collected 
At the time data was actually collected a final selection of the financial ratios to be used 
in the analysis had not been made. For this reason, a fairly complete summary of the balance 
sheets and profit and loss accounts of the 102 companies studied over the four years of interest in 
each case was obtained, along with equity price data. Some of this data eventually proved 
redundant in the computation of the ratios. All the data obtained is contained in Appendix A 
together with the twenty-four initially computed ratios for each company. 
Given below is a list of the data items collected for each company, the adjacent letter and 
figures in parentheses refers to it1 variable designation in the computer program MDA001 
(contained in Appendix C) which was used to calculate the ratios to be entered into the analysis. 
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The parenthesised figures refer to the data item concerned and the year for which it has been 
obtained. Thus, A(13,2) would refer to data item 13 (i.e. fixed assets) as entered for year T-2. 
Balance Sheet Items 
(1) Ordinary Capital    A(1,J) 
(2) Preference Capital    A(2,J) 
(3)  Revenue Reserves    A(3,J) 
(4)  Capital Reserves    A(4,J) 
(5)  Other Reserves     A(5,J) 
(6)  Minority Interests    A(6,J) 
(7)  Long Term Debt    A(7,J) 
(8) Overdraft     A(8,J) 
(9)  Creditors     A(9,J) 
(10)  Tax and Dividends Due    A(10,J) 
(11) Other Current Liabilities   A(11,J) 
(12)  Total Assets/Total Liabilities   A(12,J) 
(13)  Fixed Assets     A(13,J) 
(14)  Investments     A(14,J) 
(15)  Goodwill     A(15,J) 
(16)  Cash and Securities    A(16,J) 
(17)  Debtors      A(17,J) 
(18)  Inventory     A(18,J) 
(19)  Other Current Assets    A(19,J) 
Profit and Loss Account Items 
(20)  Turnover     A(20,J) 
(21)  Pre-Tax Profit     A(21,J) 
(22)  Total Tax Paid     A(22,J) 
(23)  Depreciation     A(23,J) 
(24)  Interest Charges    A(24,J) 
Equity Items 
(25)  High for Year     A(25,J) 
(26)  Low for Year     A(26,J) 









The Dynamics of Corporate Death – Page27 
3.6 Selection of Ratios for Analysis  
 The ratios selected for investigation in this study were chosen on the basis of their 
performance in previous research (as discussed in Chapter 1) and popularity among financial 
analysts. The final list was as given below. As in the case of the primary financial data the letter 
and figures in parentheses following refer to the ratio concerned and the year for which it has been 
computed. Thus, R(12,3) would refer to ratio 12 (i.e. working capital/turnover) as computed for 
year T-3. The ratios are grouped for convenience into six commonly recognised classes. 
Liquidity Ratios 
(1)  quick assets/current liabilities   R(1,J) 
(2)  current assets/current liabilities   R(2,J) 
(3)  working capital/total assets   R(3,J) 
Cash Flow Ratios 
(4)  working capital/cash flow   R(4,J) 
(5)  total liabilities/cash flow   R(5,J) 
(6)  total debt/cash flow    R(6,J) 
(7)  current liabilities/cash flow   R(7,J) 
Turnover Ratios 
(8)  total assets/turnover    R(8,J) 
(9)  inventory/turnover    R(9,J) 
(10) creditors/turnover    R(10,J) 
(1) debtors/turnover    R(11,J) 
(12) working capital/turnover   R(12,J) 
Structural Ratios 
(13)  current assets/total assets   R(13,J) 
(14)  current liabilities/total liabilities   R(14,J) 
(15)  working capital/net cash   R(15,J) 
(16) inventory/current assets    R(16,J) 
(17)  total retained earnings/total liabilities  R(17,J) 
Profitability Ratios 
(18)  earnings before tax and interest/total assets R(18,J) 
(19)  earnings after tax and interest/net worth  R(19,J) 
(20)  earnings before tax and interest/sales  R(20,J) 
(21)  earnings after tax and interest/sales  R(21,J) 
Interval Ratio 
(22)  quick assets/operating expenses   R(22,J) 
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Gearing Ratios 
(23)  total debt/total liabilities   R(23,J) 
(24)  market value of equity/total debt  R(24,J) 
At this stage, it is also convenient to note the following items of intermediate data. Again, each 
intermediate data item is followed by a letter and figures in parentheses, referring to the item 
concerned and the year for which it has been computed. Thus E(1,4) would refer to intermediate 
data item 1 (i.e. quick assets = cash + debtors) as computed for year T-4. 
(1)  quick assets = cash + debtors      E(1,J) 
(2)  current assets = cash + debtors + inventory + others   E(2,J) 
(3)  current liabilities = overdraft + creditors + tax and dividends + others E(3,J) 
(4)  working capital = current assets - current liabilities   E(4,J) 
(5)  cash flow = pre-tax profit + depreciation     E(5,J) 
(6)  total debt long term debt + overdraft     E(6,J) 
(7)  net cash = cash - overdraft      E(7,J) 
(8)  profit before tax and interest = pre-tax profit - interest   E(8,J) 
(9)  profit after tax and interest = pre-tax profit - tax paid   E(9,J) 
(10)  net worth = ordinary + revenue reserves + capital reserves + other res. E(10,J) 
(11)  operating expenses = turnover - pre-tax profit - depreciation  E(11,J) 
(12)  market value of equity = average equity price x average shares in issue E(12,J) 
We should note at this point that a number of terms commonly used in accounting are not, in fact, 
subject to an agreed definition among financial analysts and accountants, for example cash flow 
and net worth. The above definitions will be used strictly throughout this study as will the further 
definitions: 
total assets = fixed assets + investments + goodwill + current assets 
total liabilities = share capital + reserves + minorities + debt + current liabilities. 
The duality of the balance sheet is therefore expressed in this study by the identity: 
total assets = total liabilities 
and the terms total assets and total liabilities are therefore interchangeable. 
Many of the ratios listed above are readily recognisable, but three in particular may be 
less familiar and require some explanation. 
Ratio 22 is an approximation to the defensive interval ratio. Interval ratios were first 
described in a paper by Sorter and Benston (Sorter, G.H., and Benston, G., 1960), and empirical 
data on their predictive ability appeared in a further paper by Davidson, Sorter and Kalle 
(Davidson, S., Sorter, G.H., and Kalle, H., 1964). Such measures were designed to evaluate the 
stock of defensive assets of a firm in terms of its operating requirements for those assets and thus 
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attempted to make a dynamic measurement of a firm's liquidity. The fundamental measure in the 
class of such ratios was defined as: 
basic defensive interval = total defensive assets/projected daily operating expenses. 
Since inventories and prepayments may be considered likely to remain at roughly constant levels, 
given continued operations at a similar level of activity, and since under the same criterion daily 
operating expenditure is also likely to remain constant, this expression may be approximated by: 
defensive interval = quick assets/operating expenses. 
As already defined, operating expenses are in themselves taken to be sales less the sum of profit 
before tax and non-cash charges (i.e. depreciation). 
We may note that another interval ratio was described by Taffler and Tisshaw as being 
used in their multivariate study (Taffler, R., and Tisshaw, H., op cit), viz.: 
no credit interval = total defensive assets current liabilities/projected daily op. expenses. 
For reasons of keeping the list of ratios to be investigated down to manageable proportions in the 
time available, it was decided only to include the defensive interval ratio in the analysis. For 
similar reasons, only two of the multitude of accepted ratios relating to gearing were included. 
Ratio 17 was first described as playing an important discriminatory role in the prediction 
of failure by Altman (Altman, E.I., 1968). By and large the longer a company has been in 
existence the larger are likely to be its retained earnings as appearing in the balance sheet and thus 
the inclusion of this ratio may discriminate against those companies that have only recently come 
into existence. Altman argues that it is precisely this type of company that seems to be the more 
likely to fail and that the inclusion of this ratio is, therefore, fully justified. 
One problem encountered in the determination of this ratio was the fact that capitalisation 
issues and reserve accounting procedures can mean that the figure for retained earnings that 
appears in a company's accounts under revenue reserves is not in fact equal to the sum of the 
profits retained in the business over its life. Also, retained earnings of subsidiaries transferred to 
reserves before acquisition appear under non-distributable rather than distributable reserves. 
Adjustments for these two problems alone would have taken considerable time and as this was not 
available it was decided to incorporate the retained earnings figure as it stood (i.e. revenue 
reserves), but to treat the resultant ratio with a degree of caution. 
Ratio 24 is another of the ratios which Altman found to be a good discriminator in 
predicting company failure, more so than other more conventional measures of a company's debt 
capacity. Again, a number of problems were encountered in its calculation. Market value of equity 
is itself dependent on two variables, the market price of each ordinary share, and the number of 
shares in issue. Due to the fact that both can vary in a given year, it was decided to use the mean 
value of the high and low share prices given on the annual price range of the Extel card and the 
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average of the ordinary shares in issue at the beginning and end of the financial year concerned. 
The exception to the latter rule occurs in year T-4, where the number of ordinary shares in issue at 
the year-end alone is used, since insufficient data for the calculation of the average was collected. 
Also, the high and low share prices used are given on a calendar year basis and have been applied 
in the calculation without adjustment to take into account the fact that in the case of many 
companies their financial year ends do not coincide with the end of the calendar year. Again, 
therefore, this ratio will be treated with some caution. 
Ratio 8, total assets/turnover, is the reciprocal of one of the ratios appearing in the Altman 
model. It was decided to use the inverse form in this study to give a consistent treatment of 
turnover ratios, since in the majority of their more familiar forms turnover appears as the 
denominator rather than the numerator. 
 
3.7 Computation of Ratios 
The ratios for each company were calculated with the aid of the computer program 
MDA001 (contained in Appendix C), written in BASIC specifically for this purpose and run on a 
Hewlett Packard 2000 Data Processor. It was decided at this stage that simultaneous presentation 
of the balance sheet, profit and loss account, and equity data along with the computed ratios 
would be advantageous. All balance sheet and profit and loss account items appearing in 
Appendix A are expressed in units of millions of pounds, while equity items are expressed in 
pound units. 
During the writing of computer program MDAOO1 an error was made in the formula 
used in the calculation of Ratio 24. As printed in Appendix A for each company this ratio is, in 
fact, merely the average market value of the equity expressed in units of millions of pounds, and 
not this value divided by the book value of total debt. It was therefore necessary to recalculate 
Ratio 24 separately and these corrected values are given in Appendix B. The computer program 
MDA001 in Appendix C has also been corrected. Due to the fact that, in the case of a number of 
companies, total debt was equal to zero in one or more years, an artificial upper limit of 999.999 
was placed on Ratio 24. 
 
3.8 Separation of Samples 
The importance of testing mathematical models with data other than that from which they 
have been derived is well known and mentioned, for example, by Foster (Foster, G., 1978); it is a 
technique known as validation. Thus, once a discriminant analysis has been performed the model 
developed may be used to classify the cases constituting the model, but only if a secondary data 
sample is classified to a similar degree of success can the model be said to have been validated. 
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The initial sample of 51 pairs of companies was therefore divided into a primary sample 
containing 34 pairs of companies, from which the models were to be derived, and a secondary 
sample containing 17 pairs of companies, which was to be used for purposes of validation. The 
technique used for separation was to list the failed companies alphabetically and to transfer every 
third company to the secondary sample, along with its paired non-failed company. This having 
been done, means and standard deviations were computed for each pair of primary and secondary 
samples in respect of total assets and turnover for years T-1 to T-4. These statistics were then 
compared using t-tests on means and F-tests on standard deviations, the results being given in 
Tables 3.4 to 3.11 inclusive. Since it was only practicable to attempt to match failed and non-
failed companies on the basis of asset size in year T-1, the results of the tests were deemed to be 
satisfactory. It should be noted, however, that due to the disparity in standard deviations in some 
cases it would have been more appropriate to use an Aspin-Welch test on comparison of means 
rather than the more familiar Student's t-test. This was not done in practice since the results are 
intended to be indicative of the degree of similarity obtained rather than to provide the basis for 
substantive conclusions. 
 
3.9 Development of the Models 
Once the financial ratios for years T-1 to T-4 for each of the fifty-one pairs of companies 
had been calculated, they were input as data into the multiple discriminant analysis subprogram of 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, described already in detail in Chapter 2. 
A number of computer runs were undertaken varying such factors as the number of 
variables in the analysis and their order of entry. The object of carrying out more than one run was 
to develop a set of models containing a reasonable number of discriminating variables that would 
still manage to classify with a good degree of accuracy. The results of those runs are described in 
the following chapter. 
 
3.10 Validation of the Models 
By checking at the completion of each run to see that the predictive power determined by 
classification of the secondary sample was not significantly different to the explanatory power 
determined by classification of the primary sample, it was possible to validate each model as it 
was developed. The results of the validation tests are also incorporated in Chapter 4. 
 
3.11 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe: (1) the definition and selection of the 
samples; (2) the nature and collection of the financial data; (3) the selection and computation of 
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the ratios; and (4) the development and validation of the models. The results of the model 
development and validation tests are contained in Chapter 4. 
 
TABLE 3.4 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Assets – T-1 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 14.914 ẍ = 18.582  
s = 24.918 s = 27.287  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 0.303 t = 0.255 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 1.117 F = 1.339 ẍ = 16.699 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05) s = 23.582 
  n = 24 
t = 0.108 t = 0.353 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 1.501 F = 1.800 ẍ = 15.668 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05) s = 20.339 
  n = 17 
 
TABLE 3.5 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Assets – T-2 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 13.156 ẍ = 14.124  
s = 20.901 s = 15.723  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 0.182 t = 0.011 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 1.072 F = 1.648 ẍ = 14.065 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05) s = 20.184 
  n = 34 
t = 0.396 t = 0.218 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 1.032 F = 1.713 ẍ = 15.494 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05) s = 20.579 
  n = 17 
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TABLE 3.6 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Assets – T-3 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 6.853 ẍ = 11.997  
s = 9.591 s = 14.641  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 1.756 t = 0.182 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 2.647 F = 1.136 ẍ = 11.322 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05) s = 15.603 
  n = 34 
t = 1.309 t = 0.152 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 2.189 F = 1.065 ẍ = 11.246 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05) s = 14.190 
  n = 17 
 
TABLE 3.7 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Assets – T-4 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 4.660 ẍ = 10.178  
s = 6.310 s = 12.475  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 1.887 t = 0.223 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 4.213 F = 1.078 ẍ = 9.322 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05) s = 12.951 
  n = 34 
2.105t =  t = 0.005 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 3.988 F = 1.004 ẍ = 10.199 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05) s = 12.601 
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TABLE 3.8 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Turnover – T-1 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 14.886 ẍ = 27.070  
s = 17.92 s = 30.927  
n = 34 n = 17  
t =  t = 0.404 Primary Solvent 
not sig1.978. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 7.160 F = 2.404 ẍ = 32.250 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 47.949 
  n = 34 
t = 1.572 t = 0.700 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 48.660 F = 2.505 ẍ = 48.945 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 125.004 
  n = 17 
 
TABLE 3.9 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Turnover – T-2 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 11.746 ẍ = 22.280  
s = 12.659 s = 22.034  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 2.013 t = 0.251 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 7.677 F = 2.534 ẍ = 24.618 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 35.074 
  n = 34 
t = 1.645 t = 0.809 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 100.899 F = 33.304 ẍ = 47.602 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 127.158 
  n = 17 
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TABLE 3.10 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Turnover – T-3 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 8.198 ẍ = 19.001  
s = 8.386 s = 17.778  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 2.347 t = 0.176 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 11.997 F = 2.669 ẍ = 20.365 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 29.046 
  n = 34 
t = 1.846 t = 0.650 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 68.789 F = 15.306 ẍ = 30.312 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 69.553 
  n = 17 
 
TABLE 3.11 
Comparison of Means and Variances: Turnover – T-4 
 
Primary Bankrupt Secondary Solvent  
ẍ = 6.640 ẍ = 16.101  
s = 7.736 s = 14.991  
n = 34 n = 17  
t = 2.253 t = 0.106 Primary Solvent 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 10.569 F = 2.815 ẍ = 16.806 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 25.150 
  n = 34 
t = 1.839 t = 0.662 Secondary Bankrupt 
not sig. (0.05) not sig. (0.05)  
F = 64.805 F = 17.258 ẍ = 26.390 
not sig. (0.01) not sig. (0.01) s = 62.276 
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CHAPTER 4 
DESCRIPTION AND DISCRIMINATORY ABILITY OF THE MODELS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is primarily to describe in detail the models developed using 
the multiple discriminant analysis techniques and methodology described in Chapters 2 and 3. It 
will, however, first be necessary to explain why separate models were developed on the basis of 
the data available for each of the years T-1 to T-4. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis 
Previous multivariate studies on failure prediction appear to have assumed that any 
variable showing good discriminatory ability in year T-1 will also do so in years prior to this, 
albeit not necessarily to such a great extent. Intuitively, this idea may seem to be appealing and 
since in any case a variable is not likely to lose all-of its discriminatory power over the space of 
one year it is probably a good working approximation. 
The first major criticism of this stance came from Townsend (Townsend., T.G., 1978) 
who, referring to previously developed models, stated that: 
"Basically these models utilise centroids established at year T-1. Using these centroids, or 
norms, they then attempt to predict the failure of a firm based upon its Z-score and the 
proximity of this score to a particular centroid. 
However, the process towards failure is a dynamic process, …, as the performance of a 
company is measured an increasing number of years away from the date of failure, the value 
of Z for the failed firms approaches that of the non-failed firms." 
Townsend's subsequent recalculation of group norms for years T-2 and T-3 for the 
purpose of carrying out statistical tests greatly improved the predictive ability of the Altman 
model, on which he was working, in years prior to T-1. However, it is possible to take the concept 
of a dynamic approach to failure a stage farther, as may be seen from the following example. 
Consider a company that is heading inevitably towards failure in year T, but has so far, 
taking year T-2 as the present, maintained dividend payments on its ordinary shares at a 
reasonable level. If, in year T-2, it decides to cease such dividend payments since it is aware of 
the problems it is facing, it is conceivable that it may have a proportionately better balance sheet 
net cash position at the end of year T-2 compared with the end of year T-3, and thus liquidity 
measures such as the quick ratio might not be as good discriminators for firms at year T-2 
compared with year T-3. Simultaneously, the relative importance of discriminators incorporating 
the company's equity price might also be expected to change. 





The Dynamics of Corporate Death – Page37 
If mechanisms such as the one described above do occur generally, it ought to be possible 
to make better predictions in years prior to failure by developing separate models for each year. 
Such models would automatically utilise group centroids appropriate to the year concerned. 
 
4.3 Results Format 
Results are presented in the form of two tables for each of the years T-1 to T-4. The 
design of the two tables is identical except in so far as in each case the first table summarises the 
classification of the primary sample and the second table summarises the classification of the 
secondary sample. An example of such a table is given in Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 
Example of Results Format 
 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 N H M2 
   (%) (%) 
Failed 2 N M1 H 
   (%) (%) 
PER CENT OF PRIMARY/SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED =   SIGNIFICANCE =  
   
The actual group membership is equivalent to the a priori groupings, and the model 
attempts to classify these firms correctly. The Hs stand for correct classifications (Hits) and the 
Ms stand for incorrect classifications (Misses). It may be seen that M1 represents a Type I error 
(i.e. a failed company being predicted as non-failed), and that M2 represents a Type II error (i.e. a 
non-failed company being predicted as failed). The sums of the two diagonals represents the total 
number of Hits (from top left to bottom right) and Misses (from bottom left to top right). The total 
number of Hits when divided by the total number of cases (i.e. combined failed and non-failed 
companies) gives the per cent of the primary or secondary sample correctly classified. The chi-
squared statistic, calculated using Yates' correction method, together with the level at which it is 
significant indicates the ability of the model to classify cases correctly other than by chance. 
 
4.4 Description of the Models 
The following sections describe the controls used on each of the four initial computer 
runs and detail the predictive ability shown by each of the model sets generated. 
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4.4.1 Computer Run One 
The purpose of this run as twofold: (1) to determine the optimal predictive accuracy 
available utilizing all twenty-four ratios; and (2) by noting which variables were first entered into 
the analysis to determine which were most likely to be able to he used to produce a set of models 
capable of approaching this degree of predictive accuracy, but containing fewer variables. As has 
already been stated, order of entry of variables is not necessarily the same as their discriminatory 
ability in any model finally developed, but it was hoped that this might prove to be a reasonable 
approximation. 
In accordance with the objectives of the first run, all variables were eligible for entry into 
the analysis and a stepwise selection procedure using Rao's T criterion was undertaken. The 
classification results appear in Appendices D.1 to D.8 inclusive, the order of entry of the first 
fifteen variables in each year in Table 4.2 (parentheses indicating subsequent removal of a 
variable from the model being developed) and the standardised and unstandardised coefficients 
appear in Table 4.3. The level of predictive accuracy obtained for both this and subsequent 
computer runs is discussed fully in Section 4.5. 
Since the order of entry into analysis of the variables did alter significantly over the four 
years prior to failure, and their relative importance in the models, a second run to determine the 
predictive ability using fewer, different ratios in each year was considered justified. 
TABLE 4.2 
Entry Order of Variables, Run One 
 
Order of Entry 
Year 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 
1st Ratio 18 Ratio 23 Ratio 24 Ratio 24 
2nd Ratio 23 Ratio 18 Ratio 14 Ratio 17 
3rd Ratio 16 Ratio 10 Ratio 17 Ratio 13 
4th Ratio 11 Ratio 16 Ratio 4 Ratio 20 
5th Ratio 19 Ratio 15 Ratio 9 Ratio 23 
6th Ratio 10 Ratio 21 Ratio 19 Ratio 15 
7th Ratio 1 Ratio 14 Ratio 21 Ratio 9 
8th Ratio 3 Ratio 5 Ratio 23 Ratio 3 
9th Ratio 12 Ratio 6 Ratio 18 Ratio 4 
10th Ratio 2 Ratio 11 Ratio 20 Ratio 21 
11th (Ratio 11) Ratio 17 Ratio 11 Ratio 18 
12th Ratio 24 Ratio 7 Ratio 16 Ratio 10 
13th Ratio 4 Ratio 2 Ratio 12 Ratio 14 
14th Ratio 6 Ratio 13 Ratio 8 Ratio 11 
15th Ratio 5 Ratio 1 Ratio 3 Ratio 22 
Note: Parentheses indicate removal from analysis 
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TABLE 4.3 
Standardised and Unstandardised Coefficients, Run One 
Ratio No. 
Standardised Coefficients Unstandardised Coefficients 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 
1 -2.370 -1.314 0 -1.075 -4.894 -2.300 0 -1.887 
2 1.236 1.332 0.062 0.379 1.694 1.646 0.084 0.481 
3 1.386 0.381 -0.401 -0.464 7.319 1.052 -2.304 -0.472 
4 -0.121 0.185 0 0.547 -0.040 0.057 0 0.201 
5 0.853 -0.788 1.685 -2.836 0.051 -0.053 0.075 -0.219 
6 -0.382 0.148 -0.296 0 -0.072 0.027 -0.036 0 
7 -0.485 0.369 -1.140 2.503 -0.051 0.043 -0.092 0.348 
8 -0.235 -0.666 -0.056 -1.340 -0.646 -1.585 -0.151 -3.752 
9 0.036 0.375 -0.868 1.263 0.180 1.331 -3.725 6.691 
10 -0.787 -0.024 0 0.323 -7.589 -0.251 0 3.515 
11 -0.475 -0.761 -0.464 -1.427 -4.829 -7.546 -4.956 -12.701 
12 -0.970 -0.633 1.178 -1.193 -6.523 -4.175 7.895 -9.354 
13 -0.111 -0.574 0 -0.401 -0.724 -3.807 0 -2.528 
14 0 0 0 -2.027 0 0 0 -13.680 
15 0.084 -0.334 0 0.281 0.011 -0.038 0 0.009 
16 -1.400 -0.790 -0.373 -0.381 -8.105 -4.151 -1.913 -1.814 
17 0.079 0.381 0.358 0.523 0.347 1.796 2.109 2.899 
18 0.854 0.622 -0.720 -0.196 8.217 7.113 -9.224 -2.011 
19 -0.476 0.158 0.401 1.432 -0.485 0.270 3.636 9.396 
20 0.296 0.822 0.327 -0.651 3.856 9.470 4.365 -1.071 
21 -0.260 -1.095 0.205 -2.034 -4.349 -17.850 0.932 -39.821 
22 0.800 1.091 -0.110 3.040 6.453 7.380 -0.823 19.358 
23 -0.547 -0.460 -0.401 -0.389 -3.561 -3.240 -0.801 -1.979 
24 -0.236 -0.089 0.496 0.250 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 
Constant 0 0 0 0 6.532 4.206 1.924 9.920 
 
4.4.2 Computer Run Two 
This run consisted of direct entry into the analysis of the first six variables to have been 
entered each year during the first computer run. It was decided to use six variables in each case, 
since a number of previous researchers had developed models demonstrating reasonably good 
predictive accuracy using this number or fewer variables. It was expected, however, that the levels 
of predictive accuracy obtained on this run would not be as high as in the case of those models 
developed during the first run. The classification results for this run appear in Appendices D.9 to 
D.16 inclusive and the ratios actually used with their standardised and unstandardised coefficients 
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TABLE 4.4 
Standardised and Unstandardised Coefficients, Run Two 
Year Ratio No. Standard. Unstandard. Year Ratio No. Standard. Unstandard. 
T-1 18 -1.3604 -13.0872 T-3 24 -0.4984 -0.0001 
 23 0.1010 0.2311  14 0.4737 3.3286 
 16 0.6982 4.0415  17 -0.3596 -2.1158 
 11 0.3078 3.1260  4 -0.3551 -0.0750 
 19 0.4653 0.4616  9 0.4224 1.8135 
 10 0.4658 4.4931  19 -0.2689 -2.4354 
 Constant 0 -2.5760  Constant 0 -1.0734 
T-2 23 0.5117 3.6076 T-4 24 -0.3486 -0.0001 
 18 -0.9758 -11.1514  17 -0.6374 -3.5365 
 10 0.4727 4.8647  13 0.5560 3.5084 
 16 -0.2827 1.4852  20 0.4567 0.7520 
 15 0.2193 0.0248  23 0.4985 2.5383 
 21 0.3474 5.6617  15 -0.2941 -0.0090 
 Constant 0 -1.4133  Constant 0 -2.2518 
 
4.4.3 Computer Run Three 
This run was the control against which the hypothesis outlined in Section 4.2 would be 
tested. The run consisted of entering direct into the analysis for years T-2, T-3, and T-4 the first 
six ratios to have been entered into the analysis for year T-1 in the first computer run. The object 
of the run was, therefore, to determine whether significantly poorer success rates and chi-squared 
significance levels would occur in years T-2, T-3, and T-4 than was the case with the models 
developed during the second computer run. The classification results appear in Appendices D.17 
to D.22 inclusive, bearing in mind that the results for year T-1 would be identical to those 
appearing in Appendices D.9 and D.10, since the same variables would be entered direct into the 
analysis as in the second run. Standardised and unstandardised coefficients for the models appear 
in Table 4.5. 
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TABLE 4.5 
Standardised and Unstandardised Coefficients, Run Three 
Year Ratio No. Standard. Unstandard. Year Ratio No. Standard. Unstandard. 
T-1 10 0.4658 4.4931 T-3 10 0.4077 3.9373 
 11 0.3078 3.1260  11 0.0277 0.2963 
 16 0.6982 4.0415  16 0.3722 1.9113 
 18 -1.3604 -13.0872  18 -0.5346 -6.8503 
 19 0.4653 0.4616  19 0.0523 0.4734 
 23 0.1010 0.2311  23 0.4708 3.6141 
 Constant 0 -2.5760  Constant 0 -1.5251 
T-2 10 0.4086 4.2053 T-4 10 0.2472 2.6866 
 11 0.2382 2.3635  11 0.1236 1.0997 
 16 0.4577 2.4048  16 0.5368 2.5595 
 18 -0.6718 -7.6767  18 -0.3813 -3.9150 
 19 0.0313 0.0534  19 0.0858 0.5632 
 23 0.4978 3.5102  23 0.7041 3.5855 
 Constant 0 -2.3343  Constant 0 -2.0866 
 
4.4.4 Computer Run Four 
The fourth run consisted of entering direct into the analysis the five ratios that Altman found to be 
the best joint predictors of failure (Altman, E.I., 1968). One distinction, however, was that 
Altman's fifth ratio, sales/total assets, was entered here in the inverse form, total assets/sales. The 
object of this run was to determine whether the predictive ability of such a model set would be 
superior to that obtained in either the first or second computer runs and thereby justify the 
preferential use of the model set developed during the second computer run if such was not the 
case. The classification results appear in Appendices D.23 to D.30 inclusive, with the standardised 
and unstandardised coefficients in Table 4.6. 
TABLE 4.6 
Standardised and Unstandardised Coefficients, Run Four 
Year Ratio No. Standard. Unstandard. Year Ratio No. Standard. Unstandard. 
T-1 3 0.2494 1.3775 T-3 3 0.2128 1.2230 
 8 -0.4162 -1.1086  8 -0.2226 -0.5987 
 17 0.2571 1.1312  17 0.4568 2.6878 
 18 0.9583 9.2186  18 0.2852 3.6552 
 24 0.0710 0.00003  24 0.5594 0.00016 
 Constant 0 -0.2124  Constant 0 -0.8850 
T-2 3 0.2229 1.2012 T-4 3 -0.4617 -0.4690 
 8 -0.5382 -1.2806  8 -0.0733 -0.2053 
 17 0.3582 1.6874  17 0.7400 4.1055 
 18 0.6737 7.6984  18 -0.0354 -0.3632 
 24 0.1926 0.00006  24 0.6704 0.00021 
 Constant 0 -0.2995  Constant 0 -0.6395 
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TABLE 4.7 
Summary of Predictive Accuracy of Primary Samples 
 
RUN 
PER-CENT CORRECT CLASSIFICATION 
CHI-SQUARED (SIGNIFICANCE) 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 
ONE 
95.6 83.8 79.4 80.9 
53.48 18.53 21.24 24.16 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TWO 
86.8 80.9 79.4 76.5 
33.95 23.59 21.24 17.30 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
THREE 
86.8 83.8 72.2 66.2 
33.95 28.5 11.15 6.68 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FOUR 
86.8 79.4 63.2 69.1 
34.46 21.52 8.17 18.96 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
 
TABLE 4.8 
Summary of Predictive Accuracy of Secondary Samples 
 
RUN 
PER-CENT CORRECT CLASSIFICATION 
CHI-SQUARED (SIGNIFICANCE) 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 
ONE 
85.3 79.5 73.6 67.7 
14.36 9.67 7.25 4.49 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.01) (0.05) 
TWO 
82.4 88.3 76.5 61.8 
17.24 16.94 10.08 1.25 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.3) 
THREE 
82.4 85.3 73.6 67.7 
17.24 12.84 4.39 4.59 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.05) (0.05) 
FOUR 
88.3 88.3 79.4 64.7 
17.46 17.46 9.67 14.77 
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TABLE 4.9 
Summary of Statistical Data for Derived Discriminant Functions 
 







Group 1 Group 2 
ONE 
T-1 2.583 0.849 0.279 70.831 1.583 -1.583 
T-2 1.167 0.734 0.461 42.924 1.064 -1.064 
T-3 0.769 0.659 0.565 33.078 0.864 -0.864 
T-4 0.883 0.685 0.531 35.128 0.926 -0.926 
TWO 
T-1 1.534 0.778 0.395 59.516 1.220 -1.220 
T-2 0.853 0.679 0.540 39.484 0.910 -0.910 
T-3 0.607 0.615 0.622 30.359 0.768 -0.768 
T-4 0.544 0.593 0.648 27.788 0.726 -0.726 
THREE 
T-1 1.534 0.778 0.395 59.516 1.220 -1.220 
T-2 0.812 0.669 0.552 38.027 0.888 -0.888 
T-3 0.354 0.511 0.738 19.407 0.586 -0.586 
T-4 0.207 0.414 0.828 12.062 0.449 -0.449 
FOUR 
T-1 1.138 0.73 0.468 49.014 1.051 -1.051 
T-2 0.616 0.617 0.619 30.962 0.773 -0.733 
T-3 0.394 0.531 0.718 21.411 0.618 -0.618 
T-4 0.308 0.485 0.765 17.299 0.546 -0.546 
 
4.5 Comparative Discriminatory and Predictive Ability of the Models 
The levels of predictive accuracy obtained in the four computer runs over years T-1 to T-
4 for both the primary and secondary samples are contained in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 respectively. 
Table 4.9 summarises the statistical data on the derived discriminant functions and it is on these 
that comment will first be made. 
4.5.1. Discriminatory Ability of the Models 
The interpretation to be placed on the statistical data associated with the discriminant 
functions (i.e. models) derived from the primary sample data is given in Section 2.3.1. On a given 
computer run it would he expected that the eigenvalue, canonical correlation and chi-squared 
values would fall over the years T-1 through to T-4, with Wilk's lambda increasing over the same 
period. Such a pattern is essential if our dynamic picture of the approach of firms towards failure 
is accurate. As may be seen from Table 4.9, this did prove to be the case with the exception of 
year T-4 taking higher values for the first three statistical measures mentioned above and a lower 
value for the fourth than year T-3 on the first run (where all variables were eligible for entry). 
Similarly, the separation of the group centroids would be expected to decrease over the years prior 
to failure, as actually occurred, with the same exception as noted previously. 
Comparing runs one and two and concentrating on the eigenvalue as a representative 
measure of the functions' discriminatory abilities, we should expect to see the higher values 
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occurring in each year of the first run, rather than the comparable year of the second run. This is 
because more discriminatory variables were available for inclusion in the first run. The results 
were as expected, with a similar pattern being expected for measures other than the eigenvalue. 
If the hypothesis of varying discriminatory importance of ratios over time is correct and 
the order of entry of ratios in a full stepwise analysis as carried out in the first run is a reasonable 
approximation for their ultimate discriminatory contribution to a model, one would expect to find 
higher eigenvalues for years T-2, T-3, and T-4 on run two compared with the same years of run 
three. This indeed proved to be the case, with a similar pattern again being repeated for the other 
measures. 
A superior discriminatory performance by models based on the Altman ratios compared 
to models based on the hypothesis tested in this study would result in the eigenvalues of run four 
being greater year by year, than those of run two. Such was not the case with the eigenvalues, and 
neither was it with any other of the statistical measures. 
4.5.2. Predictive Ability of the Models 
Again, it is instructive to first compare the results of runs one and two, as they appear in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8. With only six rather than a possible twenty-four ratios present in each of the 
years T-1 to T-4, it would be expected that the proportion of successful classifications on the 
second run would, on the whole, be lower than on the first. For the primary samples this was 
certainly the case, except that for year T-3 the same success rate was obtained on each run. With 
the secondary samples, however, the difference was only marginal, two years exhibiting a 
deterioration (T-1 and T-4), end two years an improvement (T-2 and T-3). 
The next comparison to be made is between runs two and three. If the hypothesis outlined 
in Section 4.2 was correct, the performance of the models developed in run two should have been 
better than that of those developed in run three for each of the years T-2, T-3, and T-4. With 
regard to the primary samples, the performance on run two was marginally worse in year T-2, but 
appreciably better in years T-3 and T-4. As far as the secondary samples were concerned, run two 
was marginally superior in years T-2 and T-3, but fell off appreciably in year T-4. 
Comparison of run two with run four enables us to assess the superiority, if any, over the 
choice of variables dictated by the hypothesis under test with those that appeared in Altman's final 
model. For the primary samples, the Altman variables gave inferior levels of predictive accuracy 
in all years except T-1, where there was no difference. With the secondary samples, however, the 
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TABLE 4.10 
Comparative Predictive Ability of Models Developed by Altman, Townsend and in this 
Study 
 
 PER CENT CORRECT CLASSIFICATION 
YEAR ALTMAN TOWNSEND THIS STUDY: RUN TWO 
 PRIMARY PRIMARY SECONDARY PRIMARY SECONDARY 
T-1 95 92 100 87 82 
T-2 72 80 100 81 88 
T-3 48 80 80 79 76 
T-4 29 - - 76 62 
T-5 36 - - - - 
 
4.6 Comment on Empirical Results 
Unfortunately, the empirical results obtained do not unequivocally support the 
propositions that either the variables acting as best discriminators materially alter from year to 
year prior to failure, or that the variables chosen for entry in each of the years of run two are better 
discriminators than those chosen by Altman for inclusion in his final model. The statistical data 
on the discriminatory ability of the models certainly indicates that both of these propositions 
might hold, but they are not supported conclusively by the levels of predictive accuracy obtained 
as a result of applying each of the model sets to primary and secondary sample data. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, it is felt that a comparison of the predictive accuracy 
of the models developed during the second computer run with the accuracy obtained by Altman 
and Townsend is worthwhile. This is done in Table 4.10. The 100 per-cent success rates 
Townsend obtained for secondary sample classification in years T-1 end T-2 must be viewed in 
the light of his secondary sample comprising only ten failed companies, without a corresponding 
control of non-failed companies. This would be of particular importance in the case of a model 
that tend to predict failure more frequently than non-failure, a deficiency that Townsend himself 
pointed out was present in his model. Consider, for example, the extreme case of a model that 
always predicts failure. If given ten failed companies to classify, it will inevitably predict failure, 
thus achieving a 100 percent success rate. On the other hand, if giver, ten non-failed companies to 
classify, it would still predict failure, thus achieving a zero per-cent success rate. 
As may be seen from Table 4.10, the most striking aspect of the comparison is the degree 
of predictive success attained by this study in year T-4, considerably outperforming the level 
achieved by Altman and not attempted by Townsend. In year T-3, the level achieved in both 
primary and secondary samples was only marginally inferior to that of Townsend and in year T-2 
superior to the level achieved in Townsend's primary sample classification. It was considered that 
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the success rates of 87% and 82% achieved for the primary and secondary samples respectively in 
year T-1 were slightly disappointing, but did not compare too unfavourably with the rates 
achieved by Altman and Townsend. 
It must be remembered that had more time been available to test the predictive ability of 
other combinations of variables, it may have been possible to approach or even exceed the levels 
of predictive accuracy achieved on the first computer run with all variables eligible. 
 
4.7 Determination of Time Scale 
Townsend anticipated the criticism that the applicability of his models relied on knowing 
how many years prior to failure was a firm under examination. He suggested that in order to 
classify a firm it should be analysed using models with norms computed for each of the three 
years with which he was concerned. Dependent upon its classification for each year it would be 
possible to deduce not only its propensity to failure, but also when it would be likely to fail. This 
was possible since analysis of his data indicated that firms one year prior to failure were classified 
as failures on all three norms in the majority of cases. Three years prior to failure, however, the 
majority of firms were classified as failures only when tested against norms appropriate to the 
third year prior to failure. Similarly, in the second year prior to failure, the majority of firms were 
classified as failures against T-3 and T-2 norms, but not against T-1 norms. The majority of non-
failed firms were classified as non-failed against norms appropriate to each of the three years. 
It was felt to be important that the models developed in this study should be subjected to 
an equivalent analysis to determine whether a similar argument could be empirically verified. To 
this end three supplementary computer runs were undertaken. In each case secondary samples 
were classified according to the models developed in the second of the initial computer runs, the 
difference being that in the first of these further runs the T-2 secondary sample data was tested 
against the T-1 model, T-3 data against the T2 model, T-4 data against the T-3 models and T-1 
data against the T-4 model, On each of the following runs the secondary sample data was rotated 
again. 
Table 4.11 indicates the patterns of classification, or profiles that would occur if firms 
were classified precisely as suggested by Townsend. In practice, one would expect some 
deviations from ideal profiles and the results of the three further runs, summarised in Table 4.12, 
indicate that this is indeed the case. This table gives the percentage of failed and non-failed firms 
exhibiting each of the five profiles, A to E, for each of the four data years tested. 
It may be seen that although, on average, a non-failed company exhibits the expected 
profile 65% of the time, the proportion of failed companies exhibiting their anticipated profiles 
ranges from 47% (data year T-1) to less than 6% (data year T-4). Not only this, but in many cases 
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profiles are obtained resembling those that might be expected for data years other than the one 
actually being tested. For, example, using T-4 data, 41% of companies followed the profile 
thought to be appropriate to T-1 data. It must also be noted that in total sixteen possible 
classification profiles exist and, of the eleven not commented on by Townsend, six were actually 
encountered, thereby further complicating the analysis of the situation. 
It must be concluded that the models developed in the second initial computer run of this 
study are not sufficiently "finely-tuned" to allow a time scale prior to failure to be determined 
along the lines suggested by Townsend. The results obtained frequently could at best be described 
as ambiguous and, at worst, misleading. 
TABLE 4.11 
Interpretation of Prediction Results 
 
Profile 
Classified by model for: 
Inference 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 
A Failed Failed Failed Failed Profile indicates failure almost 
certain, and within 0-1 years 
B Non-Failed Failed Failed Failed Profile resembles company 1-2 
years prior to failure 
C Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Failed Profile resembles company 2-3 
years prior to failure 
D Non-Failed Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed Profile resembles company 3-4 
years prior to failure 









Failed Companies Non-Failed Companies 
Profile Profile 
A B C D E A B C D E 
T-1 47.1 17.6 11.8 0 0 0 5.9 5.9 5.9 64.7 
T-2 23.5 17.6 11.8 0 0 11.8 0 0 11.8 64.7 
T-3 23.5 11.8 11.8 5.9 5.9 0 0 5.9 11.8 70.6 
T-4 41.2 0 11.8 5.9 5.9 0 0 11.8 11.8 58.8 
Note: the percentage figures underlined are those that one would expect to be 100 per-
cent of cases examined (with all other profile percentages being zero for a given data 
year) if the Townsend pattern of classification was followed exactly. 
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4.8 Comment on Ratios Appearing in the Models 
Fifteen different ratios appear in one or more of the four models appropriate to the four 
years prior to failure developed during the second computer run. Their frequency of occurrence is 
indicated in Table 4.1. 
It is also convenient to list at this point the four models developed during the second run 
that were subjected to further analysis. The Z subscript, T-N, indicates the year to which they refer. 
ZT-1 = 4.493X10 + 3.126X11 + 4.041X16 – 13.087X18 + 0.462X19 + 0.231X23 – 2,576 
ZT-2 = 4.865X10 + 0.025X15 + 1.485X16 – 11.151X18 + 5.662X21 + 3.6083X23 – 1.413 
ZT-3 = 1.813X9 – 0.075X4 + 3.329X14 – 2.116X17 – 2.435X10 – 0.0001X24 – 1.073 
ZT-4 = 3.508X13 – 0.009X15 – 3.536X17 + 0.752X20 + 2.538X23 – 0.0001X 24 – 2.252 
Of the five Altman ratios, one contributed to the discriminatory power of the above 
models for years T-1 and T-2 (Ratio 18, earnings before tax and interest/total assets) and two 
contributed to the models for years T-3 and T-4 (Ratio 17, total retained earnings/total liabilities, 
and Ratio 24, market value of equity/total debt). The other two Altman ratios (Ratio 3, working 
capital/total assets, and Ratio 8, total assets/turnover) do not appear in any of the models. 
No ratio appears in a model on each of the four possible occasions, but one does appear 
three times, this is Ratio 23, total debt/total liabilities. Four ratios other than those also used by 
Altman occur on two occasions, these are: Ratio 10, creditors/turnover; Ratio 15, working 
capital/net cash; Ratio 16, inventory/current assets; and Ratio 19, earnings after tax and. 
interest/total assets. Seven other ratios appear on at least one occasion in the four models, namely: 
Ratio 4, working capital/cash flow; Ratio 9, inventory/turnover; Ratio 11, debtors/turnover; Ratio 
13, current assets/total assets; Ratio 14, current liabilities/total liabilities; Ratio 20, earnings 
before tax and interest/sales; and Ratio 21, earnings after tax and interest/sales. 
In further support of the hypothesis of varying discriminatory importance of ratios over 
time it may be noted that four ratios appear in the models relevant to T-1 and T-2 (Ratios 10, 16, 
18 and 23) but not to T-3 and T-4. Similarly, two ratios appear in the models relevant to T-3 and 
T-4, but not for T-1 and T-2 (interestingly, these are Ratios 17 and 24, both of which appear in the 
Altman model, which was developed by him from data relevant to year T-1 of his sample). 
 
4.9 Summary 
The purpose of this Chapter was to describe the models actually developed in this study, 
and their ability to discriminate between groups and classify cases correctly. The differing 
standardised discriminate coefficients for each of the variables present in the first computer run 
over the four years T-1 to T-4 indicated that it might indeed be possible to improve the long term 
predictive accuracy of models by selecting appropriate variables for each of the years prior to 
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failure. This hypothesis was supported to some extent by the empirical results obtained, but 
insufficient time was available to find those variables which maximised predictive performance in 
each year. Further analysis revealed that the models developed in the second of the initial 
computer runs were not sufficiently sensitive to provide unambiguous information on the length 
of time before a firm faced failure. 
 
TABLE 4.13 
The Selected Ratios and their Years of Appearance 
 
Ratio T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Altman 
3     x 
4   x   
8     x 
9   x   
10 x x    
11 x     
13    x  
14   x   
15  x  x  
16 x x    
17   x x x 
18 x x   x 
19 x  x   
20    x  
21  x    
23 x x  x  
24   x x x 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is primarily to summarise the objectives, methodology, 
findings and analysis appearing in the previous chapters. Also, certain conclusions will be drawn 
from the findings which themselves suggest areas for further research. 
5.2 Summary of Study Plan 
It was argued in the first chapter that each of the interest groups, or "stakeholders", in a 
firm has a need for knowledge regarding the future of that firm and, in particular, whether or not it 
is likely to survive. Reports such as those discussed in Chapter 1 indicated that a number of 
statistical techniques had been used in the development of models that might be of use to 
corporate interest groups in their assessment of a firm's ability to survive and the first objective of 
this study was, therefore, to obtain a working knowledge of such techniques and models as 
appearing in the literature. Once this preliminary objective had been attained, the main objective 
could be pursued, namely to develop a series of models capable of predicting failure based on data 
relating to recently failed U.K. companies. 
The basis of the empirical part of this study was similar in some respects to the work of 
Altman (Altman, E.I., 1968) and Townsend (Townsend, T.G., 1978). It was decided to use the 
statistical technique of multiple discriminant analysis to develop the model equations, as first used 
by Altman, and to concentrate on the dynamic aspects of the approach towards failure, first 
stressed by Townsend. There are a number of significant differences, however, between this study 
and those just mentioned. Firstly, this study relates to data collected on companies functioning in 
the British economy between 1966 and 1977, rather than in America prior to 1968, as was the 
case with the Altman study. Secondly, rather than merely recalculating group centroids, as in the 
Townsend study, this study recalculated both the centroids and the coefficients relevant to those 
ratios appearing in the original Altman model, utilising a larger number of companies in both the 
primary and secondary samples than did Townsend. Thirdly, the technique of multiple 
discriminant analysis was used to test a new approach to the problem of long term failure 
prediction, based on the proposition that the best discriminators of failure are not necessarily the 
same in each of the four years prior to failure. 
Thirty-four failed and thirty-four non-failed companies were used in the development of 
the models. A paired-sample design was used, the failed/non-failed companies being matched for 
industrial classification, asset size in the year prior to failure, and time period prior to failure/non-
failure. The importance of using a holdout sample for validation purposes as described by Foster 
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(Foster, G., 1978) was noted, and a further seventeen pairs of companies, similarly matched, was 
duly used for this purpose. Financial data on the total of fifty-one pairs of companies was 
collected and twenty-four potentially discriminatory ratios were first selected for analysis and 
then computed for each of the companies. These ratios were subjected to a sequence of multiple 
discriminant analyses, and five sets of models were both developed and validated. 
In view of the essentially dynamic approach of a firm towards failure, it was hypothesised 
that those ratios comprising the best discriminatory model relevant to some year prior to failure 
would not be the same as those in some other year prior to failure. This seemed to be the case, 
since the relative contribution of the ratios (as measured by their standardised coefficients) varied 
considerably from year to year in the first computer run. The predictive accuracy attained on the 
first run varied between 95% and 79% for the primary samples and between 85% and 67% for the 
secondary samples. 
Since the models developed during the first computer run contained an inconveniently 
large number of ratios (up to twenty-four), the object of the second run was to maintain the 
predictive accuracy of the models developed during the first run, whilst reducing the number of 
ratios in the models. This attempt was considered to have been marginally successful, in that the 
predictive accuracy actually attained varied between 86% and 76% for the primary samples and 
between 88% and 61% for the secondary samples. 
The object of the third run was to act as  a control series against which the hypothesis of 
varying importance of ratios over time could be tested. It was decided to use those ratios present 
in year T-1 of the second run for this purpose. Results were considered to be inconclusive. 
Although the statistical measures of the discriminatory power of the models were generally 
inferior to those obtained on the second run, the predictive accuracy varied between 86% and 66% 
for the primary samples, and between 85% and 67% for the secondary samples. 
The fourth run consisted of developing models for each year based on a choice of ratios 
similar to that used in Altman's model and later adapted by Townsend. It was hoped that the 
models developed during the second run would be superior to those developed on this run and, 
although this proved to be the case with the primary samples, where the predictive accuracy 
varied, between 6% and 69%, such was not the case with the second samples, varying between 
38% and 64%. 
Finally, three supplementary computer runs were undertaken in order to see whether it 
would be possible to use the model developed during the second computer run to determine how 
far in time a firm was from failure along the lines of the method proposed by Townsend. Again, 
results were inconclusive, only a small proportion of firms examined following precisely the 
pattern of classifications that might have been expected. 
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5.3 Conclusions and Implications 
It is felt that the empirical results obtained in the course of the study supported strongly 
the conclusions reached by previous researchers, such as Altman and Townsend, namely, that it is 
possible to predict the occurrence of company failure prior to the event with a level of accuracy 
significantly better than would be expected by chance alone. It is thought that this study is the first 
that has managed to achieve a predictive accuracy of greater than 60% four years prior to failure. 
The empirical results also supported the hypothesis that the relative importance of discriminatory 
ratios varies in the four years prior to failure studied. It was not, however, possible to show that 
this hypothesis could be used to develop models capable of significantly improving long term 
predictive accuracy. 
A final analysis indicated that patterns of failure/non-failure classification using models 
appropriate to the four years prior to failure did not lead to an unambiguous assessment of the 
time a given firm was from failure. 
The chief implication of the above conclusions is that, since it is certainly possible to 
predict with a good degree of accuracy the failure of a firm purely from an analysis of its 
published financial and equity data up to four years prior to the event, it is perhaps surprising that 
more firms do not take appropriate remedial action in good time, or conversely are still predicting 
recovery even one year before their entry into liquidation. (See, for example, Chairman's 
Statement, Worth, (Bond) Annual Report and Accounts 1976). 
It has been pointed out by previous researchers, such as Townsend (Townsend, T.G., 
1978), that models predicting failure can be self-fulfilling. If sufficient people believe that a 
company is facing failure its cost of capital will inevitably rise with a consequent decrease in 
profitability and, if the original performance was indeed marginal, an increased likelihood of 
failure. If the reason for such a belief in impending failure is the result of the application of a 
model to a firm, then that model may indeed be said to have increased the likelihood of that firm's 
failure. One must ask the question, however, as to the extent those responsible for investment and 
credit extension decisions actually rely on such models; similarly, do companies use linear 
discriminant functions to monitor their own performance and that of their competitors, customers 
and suppliers? A second question is whether or not users of such models are able to accurately 
interpret any information the models may provide. 
As far as the author is aware no research has been conducted in the former area. One firm 
of London stockbrokers does offer an analysis service based on the work of Taffler and Tisshaw 
(Taffler, H., and Tisshaw, H., op cit), of which the details remain unpublished and one 
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major multinational industrial manufacturing company has been experimenting in the use of the 
Altman model as a monitoring device for the performance of its major customers It is thought, 
however, that these two organisations may well be in the minority, at least in the U.K. 
As regards the second question, both Kennedy (Kennedy, H.A., 1975) and Libby (Libby, 
P., 1975) have described experiments designed to test the ability of analysts to correctly interpret 
accounting information. Their separate conclusions were that, although the methodology of such 
experiments is usually far from simple, relying generally on the application of Bayes theorem 
(Kennedy, H.A., op cit), perhaps not surprisingly the usefulness of accounting information is a 
function of the predictive ability of the information and the ability of users to interpret the data 
(Libby, H., op cit). 
Where, then, does this leave models developed using multiple discriminant analysis with 
respect to their applicability in the fields of accounting and treasury research? It would seem that 
they have at least two roles. Firstly, they are tools to be used by financial analysts in addition to 
those other tools of their trade with which they are probably currently more familiar; it is not 
suggested that models will replace traditional forms of analysis. Secondly, in the hands of those 
corporate interest groups of a firm whose level of financial expertise may be more rudimentary, 
they should be instruments which occasionally force management to answer questions that they 
might otherwise have avoided. The importance of models as trigger mechanisms alerting 
management to the possibility of problems ahead cannot be overestimated. Major product-market 
decisions may take more than four years to implement and almost certainly in large companies the 
consequences of such decisions will take longer than four years to make a significant impact on 
profitability. However, four years is a longer warning period than many firms have had in the past 
and, if heeded, may mean the difference between failure and its avoidance. 
5.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
The reason this study did not attempt to develop a model capable of predicting failure five 
years prior to the event was that a substantial proportion of the companies in the failed sample did 
not have financial data available this far back in time and, indeed, a number of these companies 
had only been publicly quoted for the four years prior to their failures. Notwithstanding this, 
research on a reduced sample, or a more exhaustive search for suitable failed companies, should 
lead to the development of models capable of reasonably good predictive accuracy five and, 
possibly, six or seven, years prior to failure. 
The difficulties involved in reaching a maximal solution for the choice of discriminatory 
variables have already been stated. Further analysis of the ratios used in this study would almost 
certainly lead to the development of models with predictive accuracy superior to that 
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demonstrated by the models actually developed in this study. Such an analysis might also furnish 
further support for the hypothesis of varying importance of discriminatory ratios over time. 
Possibly the most important direction for further research in this field is the investigation 
of the situation in which three scenarios are considered, for example, failure, acquisition, and non-
failure. Townsend attempted a preliminary analysis of this situation (Townsend, T.G., op cit), and 
found that the use of a single discriminant function did not produce useful results. The position is 
complicated by there now being six possible types of mis-classification: failed as non-failed or 
acquired; acquired as failed or non-failed; and non-failed as failed or acquired. It is partly for this 
reason that the use of multiple discriminant analysis in the development of two discriminant 
functions may be more appropriate, since, a priori, one may not know whether a company is likely 
to fail, be acquired, or continue in a solvent state. The consideration of only two end-states is 
equivalent to assigning a prior probability of zero to the third end state, with a consequent 
distortion of what may actually be likely to happen. 
The power of modern software packages and computer hardware is such that research 
along the lines suggested above is well within the abilities of the majority of numerate researchers 
with access to computer time. It is to be hoped that both academic and commercial researchers 
take advantage of such computing power, and that such research becomes widely published.  
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TABLE D.1 
Classification Results, Run One, T-1, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 31 3 
   (91.2%) (8.8%) 
Failed 2 34 0 34 
   (0%) (100%) 
95.6 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 53.48  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.2 
Classification Results, Run One, T-1, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 15 2 
   (88.2%) (11.8%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
85.3 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 14.36  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.3 
Classification Results, Run One, T-2, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 28 6 
   (82.4%) (17.6%) 
Failed 2 34 5 29 
   (14.70%) (85.3%) 
83.8 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 28.53  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.4 
Classification Results, Run One, T-2, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 13 4 
   (76.5%) (23.5%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
79.5 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 9.67  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.005 
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TABLE D.5 
Classification Results, Run One, T-3, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 27 7 
   (79.4%) (20.6%) 
Failed 2 34 7 27 
   (20.6%) (79.4%) 
79.4 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 21.24  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.6 
Classification Results, Run One, T-3, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 11 6 
   (64.7%) (35.3%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
85.3 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 14.36  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.7 
Classification Results, Run One, T-4, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 26 8 
   (76.5%) (23.5%) 
Failed 2 34 5 29 
   (14.70%) (85.3%) 
80.9 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 24.16  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.8 
Classification Results, Run One, T-4, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 13 4 
   (76.5%) (23.5%) 
Failed 2 17 7 10 
   (41.2%) (58.8%) 
67.7 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 4.49  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.05 
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TABLE D.9 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-1, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 29 5 
   (85.3%) (14.7%) 
Failed 2 34 4 30 
   (11.8%) (88.2%) 
86.8 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 33.95  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.10 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-1, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 17 0 
   (100%) (0%) 
Failed 2 17 6 11 
   (35.3%) (64.7%) 
85.3 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 17.24  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.11 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-2, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 28 6 
   (82.4%) (17.6%) 
Failed 2 34 7 27 
   (20.6%) (79.4%) 
80.9 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 23.59  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.12 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-2, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 15 2 
   (88.2%) (11.8%) 
Failed 2 17 2 15 
   (11.8%) (88.2%) 
88.2 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 16.94  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
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TABLE D.13 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-3, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 27 7 
   (79.4%) (20.6%) 
Failed 2 34 7 27 
   (20.6%) (79.4%) 
79.4 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 21.24  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.14 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-3, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 15 2 
   (88.2%) (11.8%) 
Failed 2 17 6 11 
   (35.3%) (64.7%) 
76.5 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 10.08  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.005 
TABLE D.15 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-4, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 25 9 
   (73.5%) (26.5%) 
Failed 2 34 7 27 
   (20.6%) (79.4%) 
76.5 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 17.30  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.16 
Classification Results, Run Two, T-4, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 11 6 
   (64.7%) (35.3%) 
Failed 2 17 7 10 
   (41.2%) (58.8%) 
61.8 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 1.25  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.3 
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Note: the classification results for Run Three, T-1, Primary and Secondary 
Samples are the same as those for Run Two, T-1, Primary and Secondary 
Samples, as given in Tables D.13 and D.14. 
TABLE D.17 
Classification Results, Run Three, T-2, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 29 5 
   (85.3%) (14.7%) 
Failed 2 34 6 28 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
83.8 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 28.5  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.18 
Classification Results, Run Three, T-2, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 15 2 
   (88.2%) (11.8%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
85.3 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 12.84  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
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TABLE D.19 
Classification Results, Run Three, T-3, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 24 10 
   (70.6%0 (29.4%) 
Failed 2 34 9 25 
   (26.5%) (73.5%) 
72.2 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 11.15  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.20 
Classification Results, Run Three, T-3, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 13 4 
   (76.5%) (23.5%) 
Failed 2 17 5 12 
   (70.6%) (29.4%) 
73.6 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 4.39  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.05 
TABLE D.21 
Classification Results, Run Three, T-4, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 24 10 
   (70.6%) (29.4%) 
Failed 2 34 13 21 
   (38.2%) (61.8%) 
66.2 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 6.68  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.01 
TABLE D.22 
Classification Results, Run Three, T-4, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 10 7 
   (58.8%) (41.2%) 
Failed 2 17 4 13 
   (23.5%) (76.5%) 
67.7 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 4.59  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.05 
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TABLE D.23 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-1, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 31 3 
   (91.2%) (8.8%) 
Failed 2 34 6 28 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
86.8 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 34.46  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.24 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-1, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 16 1 
   (94.1%) (5.0%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
88.3 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 17.46  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.25 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-2, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 28 6 
   (82.4%) (17.6%) 
Failed 2 34 8 26 
   (23.5%) (76.5%) 
79.4 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 21.52  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.26 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-2, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 16 1 
   (94.1%) (5.0%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
88.3 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 17.46  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
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TABLE D.27 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-3, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 18 16 
   (52.9%) (47.1) 
Failed 2 34 9 25 
   (26.5%) (73.5%) 
63.2 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 8.17  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.005 
TABLE D.28 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-3, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 13 4 
   (76.5%) (23.5%) 
Failed 2 17 3 14 
   (17.6%) (82.4%) 
79.4 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 9.67  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.005 
TABLE D.29 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-4, Primary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 34 18 16 
   (52.9%) (47.1) 
Failed 2 34 5 29 
   (14.70%) (85.3%) 
69.1 PER CENT OF PRIMARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 18.96  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
TABLE D.30 
Classification Results, Run Four, T-4, Secondary Sample 
Actual Group  Predicted Group Membership 
Name Code No. of Cases Non-Failed (1) Failed (2) 
Non-Failed 1 17 7 10 
   (41.2%) (58.8%) 
Failed 2 17 2 15 
   (11.3%) (88.2%) 
64.7 PER CENT OF SECONDARY SAMPLE CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED 
CHI-SQUARED = 14.77  SIGNIFICANCE = 0.001 
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